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Abstract
Understanding how humans behave has received increased attention in research in the
most recent decades. While insights into human behavior are essential for the functioning of
markets, these insights are also crucial for the guidance of policymaking and public spending
decisions to ensure that markets are fair and accessible for all. This research has the unique
opportunity to use a dataset of commercial grain trader transactions to study the decision-making
and behavior of commercial traders in agricultural commodity markets rather than institutional
investors or speculators.
Paper one focuses on the performance of commercial grain traders and their ability to
perform above expectations consistently and the role of gender and experience in achieving their
performance. First, a Fisher Exact ranking test is consulted in assessing the ability of traders to
perform persistently in two consecutive periods. Next, a top and bottom rank test is used to
evaluate the magnitude of their profitability over successive periods. In addition to the two tests
for persistent trader performance, the influence of gender and experience were also investigated
in paper one.
The second paper focuses on the use of reference points in the decision-making of
commercial grain traders. For this study, a two-way panel data model was chosen to test the
influence of a trader’s past performance or commodity price level, grain basis, influenced the
purchasing decisions of commercial grain traders when purchasing grain with forward contracts.
Past trader performance is measured in trader margin, calculated after a transaction is completed.
The amount of bushels purchased and the forward contract length were investigated to capture
risk in commodity markets by the size of the transaction or duration of the forward contract.

Finally, in the third paper, the role of the United States Department of Agriculture World
Agriculture Supply and Demand Estimate (WASDE) report is investigated regarding its public
value compared to private estimates that try to forecast the stocks-use-ratio of commodities. In
this paper, we also analyze the reaction of corn producers and not only the commercial grain
traders. Further, the different grain marketing seasons and weeks around the release of the
WASDE were tested for their importance in making buying or selling decisions in corn markets.

© 2022 Marei Undine Houpert
All Rights Reserved

Acknowledgments
I would like to express my most profound appreciation to my advisor, Dr. Andrew
McKenzie, for his invaluable guidance and continuous support. He patiently helped me
overcome the many difficulties during my studies ever since coming to the United States. I
would like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Eric Wailes for believing in me, for his
constructive criticism, and witty humor. Completing this dissertation would not have been
possible without the support and nurturing of Dr. Brink Kerr, who has helped me in countless
ways. I'd also like to acknowledge Dr. Rodolfo Nayga's insightful suggestions gratefully.
Further, I am also grateful for the support of the various staff members in the Public Policy and
Agricultural Economics and Business departments.
I cannot begin to express my thanks to my coworkers at Mullins Library, who are among
the kindest humans I have ever met. I must especially thank my supervisor Necia Parker-Gibson
for her profound belief in my work and unparalleled support during this research journey. I also
had the great pleasure of working with Norma Johnson, who has been a great source of
encouragement.
Never would I have thought of continuing my education without the encouragement of
my dear friend Stephane Makombe. I am very grateful for the shared conversations and help in
all aspects of life. I am incredibly thankful to parents Jutta and Walter Houpert for their loving
support and patience. I would also like to thank all the other family members who have
supported me in many ways. It is not always easy to live in a different country, but I am glad to
feel loved every time I come home.

Finally, I want to thank my partner and the love of my life, Thom, who has been a
constant source of encouragement and support. I am looking forward to spending my now freedup time with him.

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
References ................................................................................................................................... 7
Can Any One Trader Beat the Market Consistently and How Is Performance Related to Gender
and Experience .............................................................................................................................. 10
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 10
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 11
Institutional Trading Background ............................................................................................. 11
Literature ................................................................................................................................... 17
Data ........................................................................................................................................... 20
Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 23
Pooled Winner and Loser Rank Test ..................................................................................... 23
Top and Bottom Performance Test ........................................................................................ 25
Gender Performance Test ...................................................................................................... 27
Experience Test ..................................................................................................................... 29
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 30
Quarterly Results ................................................................................................................... 30
Yearly Results........................................................................................................................ 32
Comparison of Results........................................................................................................... 35
Gender Performance Results ................................................................................................. 36
Influence of Experience on Trader Performance Results ...................................................... 38
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 39
Limitations and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 40
Conclusion................................................................................................................................. 40
References ................................................................................................................................. 42
Tables ........................................................................................................................................ 45

Do Reference Points Impact Forward Trading Behavior? ............................................................ 64
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 64
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 65
Background ............................................................................................................................... 66
Literature ................................................................................................................................... 69
Data ........................................................................................................................................... 75
Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 77
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 82
Monthly Data ......................................................................................................................... 82
Quarterly Data ....................................................................................................................... 86
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 88
Recommendations ..................................................................................................................... 89
Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 91
Conclusion................................................................................................................................. 91
References ................................................................................................................................. 93
Tables ........................................................................................................................................ 96
The Influence of the World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimate Report Estimates on Corn
Purchasing and Marketing Behavior ............................................................................................. 99
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 99
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 100
Literature ................................................................................................................................. 101
Data ......................................................................................................................................... 107
Methods ................................................................................................................................... 110
Results ..................................................................................................................................... 114
Commercial Grain Traders .................................................................................................. 114

Corn Producers .................................................................................................................... 116
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 119
Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 121
Conclusion............................................................................................................................... 121
References ............................................................................................................................... 122
Tables ...................................................................................................................................... 124
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 133
Appendix ..................................................................................................................................... 137
Research Approval Letter........................................................................................................ 137

Introduction
Markets, where goods or services are traded, play an essential part in capitalist societies.
Neoclassical economics and expected utility theory assume the self-interest of market
participants as the motivation to trade and rational behavior (Von Neumann & Morgenstern,
1944). Under this assumption, a functional market can only be achieved when individual market
actors feel confident enough to participate in the market and accept exposure to market risk. In
an ideal case, markets provide the platform for exchange until an efficient allocation of resources
is achieved, and every participant's utility is maximized before making anyone else worse off, as
assumed by the Pareto optimum (Beckert, 2009). During the 2nd half of the 20th century, the
efficient market hypothesis was the status quo in the finance world. The efficient market theory
was characterized by Eugene Fama (1970), who stated that a market is "efficient" when prices at
all times "fully reflect" available information (Fama, 2021, p.383). This theory implies that no
market participant can continuously beat the market. Towards the end of the 20th century, the
efficient market theory was further challenged by questioning the strength of its fundamental
forces, such as arbitrage (Shleifer, 2000). Following these discoveries, behavioral finance and
behavioral economics gained popularity by no longer assuming rational behavior of individuals
or total efficiency of markets.
One of the most critical behavioral explanations of decision-making under uncertainty is
Kahneman and Tversky's so-called prospect theory. Kahneman and Tversky wrote a scathing
criticism of expected utility theory in their 1979 paper, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Making Under Risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). They described decision-making under risk
as a choice between prospects and gambles. One of their most groundbreaking advances was
discovering that individuals behave differently regarding risky choices when facing losses rather
1

than gains. Where risk aversion turns into risk-seeking behavior, "you just like winning and
dislike losing – and you almost certainly dislike losing more than you like winning" (Kahneman,
2011, p.281). A second important characteristic of prospect theory is the use of reference points.
Reference points play a crucial role in how humans evaluate gains and losses. For example, in
the case of stocks, the current stock price, the purchase price, or the all-time high price could
potentially be used to evaluate the current stock price (Nofsinger, 2017).
Prospect theory has been applied in many different fields of study today. Most prominent
is the use of prospect theory in economics and business; it accounted for about half of the
citations in 2000 of Kahneman and Tversky's 1979 Prospect Theory (Mercer, 2005). In economic
research, prospect theory is especially suitable for studies of insurance and finance, where risk
plays a central role (Barberis, 2013). Nevertheless, prospect theory has since been applied more
broadly in other fields like crisis management (Feng & He, 2018) or public policy (Bellé,
Cantarelli, & Belardinelli, 2018). Examples of the use of prospect theory for agricultural policy
include studies of crop insurance (Babcock, 2015) or organic farming (Wang, Zhu, Zhang, &
Wang, 2018).
Uncertainty in agricultural markets is a risk factor driving agricultural commodity prices
that can ultimately lead to food crises. Volatility in agricultural prices is unavoidable based on
the nature of agricultural production being seasonal and weather-dependent. However, it can lead
to problems in food security and panic-driven market behavior. Still, the production and
marketing of agricultural commodities have a long-rooted tradition in the resource-rich United
States. As early as 1911, Siebel Harris pointed out that the agricultural marketing efforts each
year burden the county's financial resources" (Harris, 1911, p.354). The agricultural programs
continue to be costly to the United States government, with a 4.6 billion dollar budget for the
2

commodity programs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and another 3.3 billion
dollars for research, education, and economics (United states department of agriculture FY 2021
budget summary.). Concerning the massive government spending on agriculture, it is crucial to
understand the behavior of the different market participants, such as producers, traders,
speculators, hedgers, and investors. The functioning of commodity markets depends on the
market participant behavior as it can potentially impact the functioning of the market (Coval &
Shumway, 2005; Nofsinger, 2018). To better guide and educate market participants, it is crucial
to understand their conscious and subconscious behavior.
Two major parties in the agricultural commodities markets are the producers, selling their
products, and commercial grain traders that either function as buyers for industrial end-users or
act as middlemen between the producers and industry. Both the producers and traders can use the
futures market to hedge price risk. The farmers or producers can use the futures market to lock in
fixed prices to sell their harvest at a later date, and vice versa, the processing industry can secure
a fixed price for their future input needs. When hedging grain trades, the so-called basis
represents the difference between the spot price and the price of the respective futures contract. It
includes the financial cost of storage, the cost of cleaning grain to the standard of the futures
contract, the cost of physical storage, including insurance, from the harvest to the actual delivery
of the grain. Lastly, the basis also includes the delivery cost to or from the futures contract's
delivery spot (Geman, 2005). In the grain merchandising business, the basis is more important
than the price per bushel, as the basis serves as the standard method of grain valuation. The
advantage of the use of basis over the bushel price is that the basis is more predictable, moving
in more distinct patterns (Lorton & White, 2002).
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Information plays a vital role in agricultural markets, especially price information of
agricultural commodities, which influences decisions about storage, but also about the
production and consumption of those commodities (Geman, 2005). (Grossman (1977) argues
that the futures market serves an informational role where informed people who collect and
analyze information share their future price information with uninformed traders. As a result,
informed traders could earn a return on investment from gathering and processing information.
The abilities to forecast spot and futures prices serve large social utility (Geman, 2005). Perloff
& Rausser (1983) describe how Grossman's finding show that information has a public element,
where commodity prices may be sufficient for uninformed market participants stemming from
underinvestment in information. While the traditional competitive market theory assumes that all
information is freely and equally available to all market participants, this assumption has been
refuted for agricultural commodity markets. Ultimately asymmetric information in agricultural
commodity markets can lead to increased market power (Perloff & Rausser, 1983).
The gathering, processing, and dissemination of market information serve a significant
economic function. The completeness and accuracy of information make markets function more
efficiently. The lack of timely fundamental market information is a known driver of agricultural
price volatility that can significantly affect food security (IMF, OECD, and WFP UNCTAD,
2011). Given the role of information, the federal government, in the form of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), provides market information by publishing several periodical reports
(Hieronymus, 1977). One of the prominent publications of the USDA is the World Agricultural
Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE). The WASDE provides public information in the
domestic and international situation and outlook information for multiple crops (IsengildinaMassa, Irwin, Good, & Gomez, 2008). Since agricultural commodity market-related information
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is valuable, several private news services collect, analyze, and disseminate information to paying
subscribers in an attempt to provide comparable and improved information than the WASDE
does, but faster (Hieronymus, 1977; Isengildina-Massa, Karali, & Irwin, 2020). Given the
increase of availability of private information and cuts in fiscal spending, the role and
importance of the WASDE has been questioned since the 1980s (Just, 1983; Xie, IsengildinaMassa, Dwyer, & Sharp, 2016).
This dissertation contains three studies that seek to enhance the understanding of
commercial grain trader behavior. The first study uses a winner and loser rank test and a top and
bottom performance test. Similar tests were used by Aulerich, Irwin, & Garcia (2013) to gain
insight into noncommercial traders' performance. The winner and loser rank tests are used to
analyze the consistency of commercial trader performance. In contrast, the top and bottom test
shows differences in the magnitude of the top and bottom trader performances. In addition,
gender and experience differences of traders are used to analyze professional trader performance.
For the second study, a two-way fixed effect panel data analysis (Jaba, Robu, & Balan, 2017)
was conducted to understand how a commercial trader's past performance influences their future
forward trading performance. The trading performance is measured by the amount of corn
purchased and the length of forward contracts. Lastly, the third study tests the influence of the
WASDE report on commercial grain traders' purchasing behavior and the selling behavior of
corn producers. For this study, a time series model was selected (Brocklebank & Dickey, 2003).
Our three papers provide essential insights for commodity market research and
policymakers. The dataset used for all three studies is unique as it was provided by a private
company and offers insights into grain merchants' behavior. This type of data is usually not
readily available.
5

The first paper adds to the understanding of the behavior of commercial grain traders and
their performance. The study also offers insights into the repeated performance of commercial
grain traders and their performance based on gender or experience. The second paper studies the
past performance of commercial grain traders as an indicator of their future performance. The
final paper considers the WASDE report as a reference point for commercial grain traders and
corn producers. Since the WASDE is freely available online, it seems like a natural reference
point to anchor grain purchasing or selling decisions on the supply and demand estimates.

Our results show that trader behavior is influenced by past performance and that
reference points offered as public information may efficiently serve agricultural producers as a
reference point in their decision-making. Further, our results demonstrate that the behavior of
market participants is not fully understood yet. Thus, further research can help guide
policymakers to effectively allocate financial resources for education about agricultural markets
and distribute helpful information for market participants to make agricultural markets fair and
efficient.
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Can Any One Trader Beat the Market Consistently and How Is Performance Related to
Gender and Experience
Abstract
Using private commercial grain trader data from a private company for the period from July
2011 to February 2018, this paper sheds light on the repeated performance of commercial grain
traders purchasing corn and soybean meal for feed mills. Two time horizons were chosen to
evaluate the commercial grain traders, monthly and yearly. The traders are first evaluated by
their ability to repeat their performance over two consecutive periods with the use of a Fisher
Exact ranking test. Further, the commercial grain traders were evaluated by the magnitude of
profitability. To assess the difference in the profitability of traders a top and bottom performance
test was used for each time horizon. We find that traders may be able to repeat their performance
on the quarterly time horizon for the shorter time horizon we also found a difference in
magnitude of profitability for the top and bottom-ranked trader. Additionally, we investigated the
role of gender and experience on commercial grain trader performance.

Keywords: agricultural economics; futures markets; predictability; gender differences
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Introduction
In order to guide policy decisions affecting agricultural markets, it is important to
understand how those markets function. The behavior of market participants is one of the most
important factors in the functioning of markets. Among others, previous studies on fair market
participation for farmers (Hendrickson & Petty, 1994), or the role of speculators in agricultural
commodity markets (Koziol & Treuter, 2019) have been paving the way to gain a deeper
understanding of the role of agricultural market participants. This study uses a unique dataset
that allows us to take a close look at the behavior and performance of commercial grain traders.
We are particularly interested if certain traders are able to consistently perform better than
others, and what role gender and experience play in the commercial trader performance.

Institutional Trading Background
This research focuses on an agribusiness firm that purchases large quantities of corn and
soybean meal throughout the year. As such, the corn and soybean meal purchases are important
input costs in this process, and the price at which they are purchased can have a material impact
on the firm's profit margins. To effectively manage the price risk associated with these inputs,
the firm employs a dedicated team of traders to hedge their costs and effectively lock in the
purchase price of the grain prior to its physical delivery. This price risk management task is
divided between two different groups of traders. One group is tasked with timing the purchase of
futures contracts (long/bought futures positions), and the other group of traders – who are the
focus of this study – are tasked with timing when to lock in the basis (long/bought basis
positions) component of the hedge. Basis is formally defined as the difference between the cash
price of a commodity and its respective futures price (𝐵𝑡 = 𝐶𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝑃).
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To illustrate, consider the general case of a firm that is hedging its future input purchases
and is faced with upside price risk prior to establishing/contracting a price for the inputs. More
formally, the cash price for a commodity observed in time t+1 in market j is a stochastic random
variable upon which grain traders for the hedging firm will form expectations about at time t, so
that:

𝐶𝑃𝑡+1,𝑗 = 𝐸𝑡 (

𝐶𝑃𝑡+1,𝑗
) + (𝑈𝑡+1,𝑗 )
Ω𝑡

(1)

where 𝐸𝑡 (𝐶𝑃𝑡+1,𝑗 ⁄Ω𝑡 ) is the expectation of the future cash price formed in period t, and Ω𝑡
denotes the information set available in period t, and 𝑈𝑡+1,𝑗 is an expectations error. Our analysis
assumes that the quantities of a commodity that will be purchased in period t+1 are known at
time t. In other words, any quantity risk that may exist as a component of overall input cost risk
is ignored. This is not an unreasonable assumption in the case of our hedging firm, which has
detailed knowledge of the amount of gain needed at its various feed mills (represented as market
location j) at different times in the year.
In our case, to mitigate the price risk associated with 𝐶𝑃𝑡+1,𝑗 𝑜ur hedging firm traders can
use forward contracts, futures contracts, and basis contracts. Forward contracts, entered into in
period t, establish a fixed cash price for period t+1. Traders can enter into these contracts with
grain merchandising firms (elevators) and/or farmers. Hedged positions, formed at time t using
either forward contracts or futures contracts tied to basis contracts, remove all of the conditional
price risk. In other words, the conditional variance of 𝐶𝑃𝑡+1,𝑗 at time t is zero once these hedged
positions are established. However, the decision of when to establish the hedged positions and
lock in the price is complicated, hence the need for professional traders with experience and

12

knowledge of market supply and demand conditions and what would be considered a good value
to lock in effective purchase prices.
In the case of forwards contracts with resellers/merchandisers/elevators, the traders
choose the timing of when to enter these contracts and lock in a price. Although there is some
negotiation on the forward contract price, essentially, it is the elevator that offers the price, and
this price is dictated or determined by supply and demand in the local cash market. With respect
to the farmer-based forward contracts, our hedging firm offers the forward price – again subject
to market conditions – and the farmer chooses the timing of when to contract for any time greater
than six weeks prior to physical delivery. Besides forward contracts, farmers are also offered
basis contracts where the basis is fixed and the futures price is determined later, or Hedge-toarrive contracts where the futures price is set and the basis is determined later. Given that the
marketing/risk management decision rests with farmers in the second case, all farmer contracting
observations are excluded from the analysis in this first essay. However, farmer contract
observations are included in the analysis presented in the third essay. In the context of equation
(1), if traders' price expectations, 𝐸𝑡 (𝐶𝑃𝑡+1,𝑗 ⁄Ω𝑡 ), exceed the observed forward contract price,
𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 for delivery in period t+1, and observed in period t, there will be an incentive to enter
into a forward contract to lock in at least some amount of the anticipated grain that will be
needed in period t+1 for market location j.
Turning to the case when our hedging firm uses futures and basis contracts to manage
price risk, the market timing and risk management decisions are separated in terms of type of
contract and trader. The vast majority of trades in our sample data are basis contracts. Large long
futures positions are accumulated over time to cover anticipated physical cash purchases, which
have not already been forward contracted. Analogously to the forward contracting decision, if
13

𝑡+1 ⁄
traders' price expectations, 𝐸𝑡 (𝐹𝑡+1
Ω𝑡 ) , exceed the observed future contract price, 𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 , in

period t, there will be an incentive to buy futures contracts to cover at least some amount of
anticipated future grain purchases in period t+1 across market locations. The timing of these
futures contract purchases in terms of quantity and pricing targets are made by a group of
expienced traders. These trades are not part of our analysis. Instead, we focus attention on the
risk management decisions of the group of traders who are responsible for buying basis contracts
to help hedge the price risk associated with the future purchases of cash grain. When traders'
basis expectations at time t, 𝐸𝑡 (𝐵𝑡+1 ⁄Ω𝑡 ), exceed the observed basis contract value 𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 , which
locks in the basis for delivery period t+1, there is an incentive to enter into the basis contract.
This is because the lower the basis value that is locked in, the lower the effective hedged
purchase price. This is illustrated by considering how the price risk is associated with the
expected cash price from equation (1), 𝐸𝑡 (𝐶𝑃𝑡+1,𝑗 ⁄Ω𝑡 ), is hedged using futures and basis
contracts. The effective cash purchase price 𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑡+1,𝑗 in period t+1 for market location j, can be
locked in or established in period t by forming a hedge with long futures in period t:
̂𝑡+1,𝑗 = 𝐹𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡 (𝐵𝑡+1 )
𝐸𝐶𝑃

(2)

Note that the expected basis, 𝐸𝑡 (𝐵𝑡+1 ), is a stochastic random variable, so hedging with long
futures alone establishes the effective cash purchase price, subject to basis risk. In other words,
̂𝑡+1,𝑗 is a stochastic random variable.
because of basis risk the effective cash purchase price, 𝐸𝐶𝑃
However, if the basis is also locked in through the purchase of a basis contract in period t, all
price risk is removed, and the effective cash purchase price is fixed:
𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑡+1,𝑗 = 𝐹𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝑡𝑡+1

(3)
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̂𝑡+1,𝑗 , so the lower is 𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 in comparison to
Note that if 𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 < 𝐸𝑡 (𝐵𝑡+1 ), then 𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑡+1,𝑗 < 𝐸𝐶𝑃
𝐸𝑡 (𝐵𝑡+1 ), the lower is the effective cash purchase price. With this in mind, if traders can
consistently buy basis contracts at levels below the resulting basis levels at the physical delivery
time of commodity purchases, effective cash purchases will be cheaper, and price risk will be
removed. In our sample data, the vast majority of transactions are basis contracts. The natural
metric with which to evaluate traders' performance in terms of basis trading is the difference
between the actual basis at physical delivery time t+1, denoted as 𝐵𝑡+1 , and the basis established
through a basis contract in period t, denoted as 𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 We refer to this as the traders' margin:
𝑇𝑀 = 𝐵𝑡+1 − 𝐵𝑡𝑡+1

(4)

Note TM is positive when traders lock in basis levels – using basis contracts – at levels below
basis at physical commodity delivery time. All of our subsequent empirical analysis is focused
on TM for individual traders. The TM that we evaluate is generated as an internal metric by the
firm and accounts for spatial differences in transportation costs across market locations. The
firm's adjustment for transportation costs makes TM comparable across market locations and by
the trader. It should also be noted that even if a trader locks in the cash purchase price of the
commodity through a forward cash contract, the transaction is also evaluated in terms of TM.
The forward contract price established at time t is converted into an equivalent basis value, 𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 ,
using the difference between the cash forward contract price 𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 and the current futures
price 𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 .
Using TM as a trader performance metric has certain drawbacks. For example, traders'
decisions on when to lock in basis and prices may not be just based upon comparisons between
their basis expectations and current basis contract values. They may also consider the conditional
variance of basis and price – or in other words, the degree of price risk when making risk
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management decisions. If current market conditions are volatile – and price/basis risk high –
locking in price and basis with hedges may be preferable, even if current basis contract levels are
higher than the expected basis level at physical delivery time. In addition, although our firm
tracks TM by trader, we do not know if it is used in any formal evaluation process, and individual
traders may be unaware of their own performance in terms of TM. As such, their risk
management decisions may be only indirectly influenced by their TM performance. However,
TM is an interesting metric to evaluate trader performance and is perhaps the best available
measure of whether traders can consistently lower the firm's effective purchase prices while also
removing price risk. TM also has interesting implications with respect to market trading
efficiency (EMH) in physical cash markets for corn and soybean meal. EMH implies that the
future price at any point in time is equal to the markets' expected futures price at contract
𝑡+1
𝑡+1
maturity, or more formally, 𝐸𝑡 𝐹𝑡+1
= 𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 . Therefore, on average, the margin (𝐹𝑡+1
− 𝐹𝑡𝑡+1 )

associated with any trading position taken at time t by traders/speculators would be zero.
Unbiased and efficient future prices, which adjust quickly to current market information, do not
provide systematic positive trading margins. Analogously, if physical cash basis markets are also
𝑡+1
EMH unbiased ( 𝐸𝑡 𝐵𝑡+1
= 𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 ), then taking basis contract positions at time t should not result

in systematic positive trading margins. However, little academic research has investigated if this
is true, and it is ultimately an empirical question. McKenzie, Isbell, and Brorsen (2019), is one of
few studies that have addressed this issue, found that forward basis contracts for the delivery of
grain at the Gulf contained systematic pricing biases or risk premiums.
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Literature
Aulerich, Irwin, and Garcia (2013) compared individual non-commercial traders'
performance in agricultural futures markets, specifically corn, live cattle, and coffee futures
markets. They investigated whether non-commercial traders can be successful repeatedly. Noncommercial traders are also referred to as speculators. Their study focuses on a rather large set of
traders from the Commodity Futures Trading Commissions Large Trader Reporting System and
focuses on corn, cattle, and coffee traders. Besides different commodities, they chose different
time horizons, monthly, quarterly, and yearly. Aulerich et al. (2013) used two main tests for their
analysis: a winner and loser rank test and a top to bottom decile test. The profitability measure in
this study is based on daily aggregate profits. Their study revealed persistence in the
performance of traders in terms of making profits.
Luck is the main factor determining trader performance, according to Hartzmark (1991),
who tested if futures traders in agricultural commodities can consistently earn positive profits.
The data used consisted of commercial and non-commercial traders in nine different agricultural
futures markets. When tested for forecast ability, only commercial traders in the pork belly
markets were on average able to show significant forecasting abilities. Commercial traders were
also credited with a slightly superior forecast ability than the speculators, which may be due to
better and timelier information access. Hartzmark also tested the skill hypothesis where traders'
performances are compared in two time periods. In general, he found no support for noncommercial traders' performance to be persistent across time.
Leuthold, Garcia, & Lu (1994a) extended Hartzmark's results with respect to traders'
outstanding forecast performance in the pork bellies market. They also found that a subset of
elite traders, as they call them, can forecast price movements in the market and profit from their
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forecasts. Leuthold et al. suggest that specific traders can increase their skill and ability to
forecast market movement levels with accumulated experience and market knowledge. Other
traders, especially short-hedgers and spreaders, did not show a superior forecasting ability when
trading, which could be due to their specific risk management strategy use of the futures market.
For example, those traders may simply be short hedging their cash market positions, with no
motivation to profit from their futures trades. In our case, futures market risk management
hedges are conducted by a separate set of traders, whose main focus are futures market
transactions. The traders our research focuses on are covering the demand of the feed mills while
using forward contracts and basis instead of the commodity price. While our traders are not short
hedging themselves, they may find themselves in situations at times where they need to buy
regardless of the basis or price to keep their feed mills from loss of production. For this reason,
to focus on the forecasting ability of the traders, short notice spot market transactions are not
included in this research.
Numerous studies have compared the risk-taking behavior of males and females in
diverse contexts. A meta-analysis from 1999 about gender differences in risk-taking (Byrnes,
Miller, & Schafer, 1999) concluded that generally, men are more likely to take risks than females
but to a variable extent across ages and contexts. Croson & Gneezy (2009) confirm the finding of
women being more risk-averse than men in a majority of tests. They also provide speculative
reasons as to why women might make more conservative choices when faced with risk. Firstly,
adverse outcomes are feared more strongly by women who are also more prone to feeling fear or
nervousness. Women experience emotions more intensely than men, which might affect the
utility of a risky choice. Secondly, women show less overconfidence in their investment
decisions. Women evaluate their success less favorably than men would do in the same situation,
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leading to men more readily accepting risky gambles. Lastly, men are more drawn to egoinvolving situations, which women in return might perceive as a threat and shy away from, given
their different motivations. The overconfidence problem mentioned by Croson and Gneezy is
also named as a cause of high levels of financial trading by Barber & Odean (2001). They state
that humans who are overconfident about their abilities, knowledge, and prospects trade more
frequently. Barber and Odean (2001) explain that rational investors only invest time and
information in trading when they can increase their expected utility. Simultaneously,
overconfident investors invest too much in gaining information and lower their expected utility
by executing too many trades. The greater overconfidence that psychologists have found in men
leads to men trading more than women, which leads to men suffering lower performance due to
the increased trading rate. Barber and Odean (2001) found that single men reduced their returns
by 1.44 percent compared to single women by overly frequent trading. A lower willingness to
take risks in personal financial contexts could result in women opting for low-risk portfolios.
And selecting low-risk portfolios will lead to lower expected returns over long periods compared
to higher-risk portfolios often chosen by men leading to a gap in wealth (Nofsinger, 2017).
Across the professionals employed in finance, gender differences are often nonexistent.
Atkinson, Baird, & Frye (2003) compared the performance of fixed income funds managed by
men and women with similar education and found similar investment behavior. Dwyer,
Gilkeson, & List (2002) Investigated mutual funds investors' behavior and found no significant
difference for female investors with financial and investment knowledge when taking investment
risks. They further conclude that knowledge disparities can partly explain the differences in
women and men making financial decisions.
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Experience is another factor affecting trading behavior according to the behavioral
finance literature. Previous studies have mainly focused on stock and options markets (Barber &
Odean, 2001; Hoffmann, Post, & Pennings, 2015a) rather than commodity markets. However, all
share similar findings, with less experienced traders exhibiting a more unsatisfactory
performance in terms of returns than more experienced traders do. That traders improve in their
investments over time was also found by (Nicolosi, Peng, & Zhu, 2009), who found that retail
investors in the stock market can improve their trading with increased experience. Stock
investors not only increased portfolio returns with increased experience but also improved the
quality of their trades.

Data
The dataset for this research was provided by a company purchasing corn and soybean
meal for further processing for livestock feed. This dataset comprises soybean meal and corn
trades executed between July 2011 and February 2018. In total, there are more than 30,000
individual trades or observations executed by 13 traders. Out of the 13 traders, four are females
and nine males, with their grain trading experience ranging from beginner level to over 30 years
in 2018. Besides information about the trader, the transactions contain information about the
transaction dates, locations, transportation mode, prices, etc. In the dataset are 70 different
locations that are destinations for commodity deliveries. For a trade to be labeled as a forward
contract and to be included in this data analysis, 12 days or more have to lie between the contract
agreement and the delivery date. All trades in the dataset based on the farmers' decision to sell
their products are excluded. Only transactions initiated by the company traders are used for the
data analysis. Most of these transactions are basis contracts between the purchasing company and
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large resellers or merchandising firms. Several conversions of volumes and prices had to be
conducted to unify the units to U.S. dollars per bushel. These conversions were necessary to
achieve comparability of the transactions of the two commodities. All amounts that were
provided initially in lbs and were converted to bushels. Soybean meal prices, and basis were in
U.S. dollars per short ton, and for the corn trades, numbers were already in U.S. dollars per
bushel. Soybean meal was converted with 2000 lbs in one short ton and 54 lbs soybean meal per
bushel, while 56 lbs of corn are equal to one bushel (Common weights.). Ultimately, all TMs for
corn and soybean meal were converted into dollars per bushel and the two types of commodity
trades were combined in the analysis.
All following tests are conducted with a merged dataset consisting of both corn and
soybean meal trades. The two commodities' TMs were compared in a paired t-test that did not
significantly differentiate the two commodities. Unfortunately, corn and the soybean meal
monthly data set by themselves did not contain a sufficient amount of traders or observations to
analyze by a single commodity. Not all traders are active simultaneously, meaning, in this case,
they don't have deliveries arriving in a respective time horizon. Most traders specialize in one
commodity and trade mostly just either corn or soybean meal, which can lead to periods,
especially short term, where only three traders receive orders of either commodity. Additionally,
some of the traders were hired after the first day of the dataset, which led to increasing trader
numbers in the later periods.
The most important variable for this analysis is the TM per bushel in U.S. dollars, which
is calculated for every trade. It is the difference between the previously agreed-upon delivery
price and the spot market price at the delivery time. The TM quantifies in retrospect how good or
bad the forward agreement was. It expresses how much was over or underpaid compared to a
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spot market purchase at delivery. If the TM is 0, the prearranged price and the actual spot market
price end up equal. A negative TM would indicate that the prearranged forward contract price
was higher than the final spot price observed at the forward contract's maturity. A negative value
for the TM represents an over-payment. A TM greater than 0 would indicate that the forward
contract price was less than the final spot market price observed. A positive TM means that the
trader has achieved a lower price than if it was purchased in the spot market on the day of
delivery. Table 1 shows the mean TM for all trades per trader over the whole dataset.
All transactions are evaluated based on the delivery date for this specific analysis. Which
period a trade falls into is determined by the delivery date. The grouping of trades by delivery
date is essential as all trades have a different contract length, and it can be assumed that the
demand for the commodities is steady throughout the year. Traders might set up more
transactions at a particular time, but the different expected delivery periods make it difficult to
compare them. The data is most comparable by grouping the trades by the delivery date. TMs are
calculated for every transaction per trader per quarter or year based on the month in which the
delivery took place. A descriptive table of the yearly mean TMs per trader is displayed in table 2.
In table 3, the quarterly TMs per trader are displayed. The year's quarterly periods are separated
by the crop production cycle, starting with an assumed harvest on September 1st. Accordingly,
the first quarter comprises the months of September, October, and November. The second
quarter includes December, January, and February. Next, the third quarter comprises March,
April, and May, while the last quarter covers June, July, and August.
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Methods
Four main tests were used for the analysis of this study. First, a pooled winner and loser
rank test was applied, second, a top and bottom performance test, third, a gender performance
test, and lastly, an experience test. All data analysis was conducted with SAS (Insititue Inc.,
2019)1 SAS and (Microsoft) Microsoft Excel software.

Pooled Winner and Loser Rank Test
The pooled winner and loser rank test is conducted for yearly and quarterly time
horizons. For this nonparametric two-way winner and loser contingency table test, traders are
categorized into winner and loser categories. All traders are ranked from best to worst
performance for each period by their average TM of forward contracts scheduled for delivery in
the respective time frame. The ranking ranks the trader with the highest mean TM in the first and
lowest on the last rank. The test uncovers consistent or persistent superior trading performance
over time. In other words, we are able to determine if some traders exhibit superior trading skills
over time.
The analysis starts with creating sets of adjacent periods, t and t+1. In the case of a yearly
time horizon, 2012 and 2013 represent the first set of adjoining periods, and 2016 and 2017 are
the last. In total, there are five adjacent pairs of periods. For the quarterly data, the first period
starts on December 1st of 2011, and the last period ends on February 28th, 2018, yielding 20
usable period pairs. To be included in a bracket of adjoining periods, traders have to be active in

1

The data analysis for this paper was generated using SAS software. Copyright © [2002-2012] SAS Institute Inc.
SAS and all other SAS Institute Inc. product or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of SAS
Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA.
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both. If a trader was active in t but not in t+1, they are not included in the pair of periods and
disregarded. Periods in which less than four traders have been active are not considered and
excluded from the analysis. Given the limited number of traders in this data set, the top two
performing traders are categorized as winners and the bottom two as losers. Most adjacent
periods have at least four active traders, which would provide two winners and two losers. If
more than four traders are active, only the top two and bottom two are winners or losers, and the
other performances of traders are seen as mediocre, neither a winner nor a loser.
For the winner and loser rank test, we count how many traders fall into one of the
following categories per period pair. A count is recorded in category A of the number of traders
who have been a winner in period t and are winners again in period t+1. The second count,
category B, is the number of traders who have been a winner in period t but fell into the loser
category in t+1. The third category, C, includes the counts of traders who have been a loser in t
but switched to the winner category in the following period t+1. Lastly, category D, the fourth
group of counts, are all traders who were losers in period t and again in the subsequent period
t+1. In every period, t are two winners and two losers, but it is possible that the total count of
traders in t+1 is less than four. When the total number of placings in t+1 is less than four, the
period pair needs to have more than four traders, and one trader, who was either a winner or loser
in t, falls into the middle range (neither winner nor loser) in t+1.
After determining how many of the four traders of the first period (t) in each bracket are
either winners or losers in the second period (t+1), all counts for categories A, B, C, and D are
summed up to be pooled.
A Fisher's Exact Test is applied to the pooled data to test for the traders' persistent
placement. The Fisher's exact test is used in cases where the expected number in one or more
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cells is too small for a chi-square test. Like the chi-square test, the test evaluates whether
distributions of the average TMs of traders categorized in A, B, C, or D are the same. In our case,
the four categories are traders in who are winners in t and t+1, winners in t and losers in t+1,
losers in t and winners in t+1, and losers in t and t+1. The 2 by 2 table has two dimensions: the
rows, the columns, and in a random distribution, a conditional probability of 50% would be
expected between the two classifications. In our case, the null hypothesis is that the trader
ranking in t+1 is independent of the ranking in t. A rejection of the null hypothesis would
indicate that the ranking of a trader in t+1 is dependent on the trader’s ranking in t, and this
would be evidence that trader performance was persistent across time. In other words, traders
who exhibited superior performance in t were more likely to also have superior trading
performance in period t+1.On the other hand, traders who exhibited inferior trading in t were
also more likely have inferior trading performance in t+1. These findings would be consistent
with the notion that some traders have consistently superior or inferior trading skills.

Top and Bottom Performance Test
Given that superior trading skills may only occur at the extremes of trading performance,
we also use a Top and Bottom performance test to measure the magnitude of the differences in
the top and bottom traders’ TMs. As in the previous test, time brackets of adjacent time periods
are created of traders active in both periods. Again, the test is designed to uncover superior
trading performance by determining if trading margins are significantly different over time
between traders who initially are ranked as best and worst performers.
First, traders are ranked by their performance in t—the highest average TM ranks in the
first spot and lowest average TM in the bottom spot. Next, the trader's average TM is calculated
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in t+1, and the average TM from t+1 is attached to their ranking in t. Their performance in t still
ranks the traders, but the values of the average TMs attached are from t+1.
Two comparisons are conducted to assess the magnitude of difference between the top
and bottom rankings. In the first comparison, the top-performing spot is compared to the bottom
performance. The second comparison compares the average of the two top performances to the
two bottom performances' average. All average TMs are collected for the top performing traders
and the respective bottom performing traders. This step is necessary to use paired t-tests to assess
if the difference between the winner and loser group is different from zero.
The t-test is recommended for top and bottom rank tests by (Carpenter & Lynch, 1999),
who compared mutual funds’ performance persistence test methodologies. If a normal
distribution or independent observations assumption fails to hold for the t-test, the Wilcoxson
Signed Rank test provides a viable alternative. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is conducted by
Aulerich et al. (2013) in addition to the paired t-test.
Calculations for the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test are carried out by first defining the null
hypothesis, in this case, that the median difference (M) between the top (a) and bottom (b) group
is equal to zero. Secondly, each paired difference (d) is calculated for the observation pairs of ati
and bti. dti= ati - bti. Next, the dtis are sorted by rank while ignoring the sign. Then each rank is
labeled with its sign, according to the sign of dti. In the next step, all positive dtis are summed up
to W+and all negative dtis are summed up to calculate W-. Choose W = min(W-, W+), and with
the help of a table, the p-values can be obtained.
If the TM difference in t+1 between top and bottom performing traders is significantly
different from zero, persistence in the trader performance can be assumed. In other words, strong
trading performance in t should be carried over to t+1 if certain traders truly have consistent and
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superior trading skill. If the average TM difference between top and bottom performing traders
declines between t and t+1, and is not significantly different from zero, this would indicate
trading performance is random and cannot be attributed to skill. Therefore, the H0 of the t-tests
and the Wilcoxon rank test states that the top and bottom trader's performance is not different
than 0.
The Top and Bottom Performance test was applied to the same corn and soybean meal
transactions dataset as the previous rank rest. In addition, the analysis was applied for the yearly
and quarterly periods.

Gender Performance Test
The third part of the data analysis focuses on the performance of the different genders.
Here we compare the average yearly TM and the achieved by male and female traders in 2017
and over the whole dataset with an independent two-sample t-test. The year 20107 was chosen as
this year had the most active traders. Also, focusing on one year has the advantage that all mean
TMs were achieved under similar market conditions. As for the previous tests, all transactions are
based on their delivery date that falls into 2017.
The SAS command for the two-sample t-test also provides the folded F test results to test
for the assumption of homogeneity of variance. SAS uses F for the two-sample F-test, which is a
ratio of sample variances; 𝐹 = 𝑠12 /𝑠22 . For the two-sample t-test, it is arbitrary which sample is
labeled 1. For the folded F-test SAS chooses the larger sample variance to be placed in the
numerator. The folded F-Test is calculated as follows (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group):
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2
Where 𝑠𝑚
is the male sample variance and 𝑠𝑓2 is the female sample variance. The folded F-test

tests the H0: The variances of females are equal to the variances of males. The SAS t-test
provides a pooled t-test appropriate for equal variances if we accept the null hypothesis. Suppose
the assumption of homogeneity of variances is violated, and we have to accept the alternative
hypothesis for the folded F-test. In that case, the SAS t-test provides the Satterthwaite alternative
to the pooled method. The pooled t-test statistic is calculated as (Kent State University Libraries,
2021):

𝑡=
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(𝑛𝑓 − 1)𝑠𝑓2 + (𝑛𝑚 − 1)𝑠𝑚

𝑛𝑓 + 𝑛𝑚 − 2

(7)

Where 𝑥̅ is the mean of the respective gender, m indicating male and f female. The sample size is
n, s is the standard deviation, and 𝑆𝑝 is the pooled standard deviation. The calculated t value can
then be compared to a t table critical t value and with degrees of freedom 𝑑𝑓 = 𝑛𝑓 + 𝑛𝑚 − 2.
When the folded F test does not indicate homogeneity of variance between males and females,
the Satterthwaite t value is calculated as:
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Here 𝑥̅ is the mean of the gender, with f standing for female and m for male. The sample size n
and standard deviation s complete the equation. The t value calculated with this equation is then
compared to a critical t value from a table. The degrees of freedom are calculated as follows:
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(9)

Experience Test
The fourth and final test focuses on the experience of the traders, with the question being
does level of trading experience influence trading performance. Analogous to the gender
performance test, we focus this test on one single year, 2017. Limiting the data to one year
provides the same market conditions for all traders and is most suitable to compare experience
levels. Due to the limited number of active traders each year, 2017 was chosen as the year with
the most active traders. To analyze if the trader's experience level influences the average TM, we
split the traders into two different experience levels. The ten traders of 2017 are split into
experience levels of three years or less and four years and more, based on their work experience
in 2017.
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Results
The results section will first look at the winner and loser rank test results and at the top
and bottom performance tests. Next, the Results are split up into quarterly time periods and
yearly time periods.

Quarterly Results
The descriptive statistics for the quarterly average mean TMs per trader are shown in
table 3, and table 4 shows the more detailed mean TMs per quarter. The ranking in table 3 shows
that trader 2 was most successful over the whole time span of the dataset by quarters. Trader 2
achieved an average mean TM of 0.36 U.S. dollars per bushel. On the bottom end, trader 6
averaged a mean TM of 0, None of the traders had a negative average mean TM over all the
quarterly periods.

Quarterly Winner and Loser Rank Test Results
The winner and loser distribution in t+1 based on their ranking in t for the quarterly data
is displayed in table 5. The pooled count of the 20 quarterly brackets is recorded in table 6. Out
of 40 winners in t based on their average TM performance, 23 traders achieved a winning
ranking again in t+1. Therefore, the conditional probability of being a winner in t and again in
t+1 is 58%. Only 12 out of the 40 winners in t slipped into the loser category in the next quarter,
equaling a 30% conditional probability of being a winner in t and a loser in t+1. Those 40 traders
in the loser category in t had a conditional probability of being a loser again in t+1 of 60%.
Thirteen out of the 40 traders in the loser category in t could flip their ranking to a winning
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placing in t+1. The conditional probability of being in the losing category in t and the winning
category in t+1 is 33%
Fisher's exact test results for the quarterly pooled data in Table 7 show that the two-sided
p-value is 0.0178. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis assumption of independence of trader
performance across periods at the 5% significance level. This result indicates that based on our
quarterly results, there is a group of superior traders that consistently outperform other traders. It
would appear that some traders have superior or inferior trading skills.

Quarterly Top and Bottom Performance Test Results
Table 8 shows the TMs of the top and bottom-ranked traders in the respective quarters.
The top and bottom traders in t achieve an average mean TM of 0.37 U.S. dollars per bushel and
0.16 U.S. dollars per bushel, respectively in t+1. The top trader outperforms the bottom trader in
t+1 by 0.21 U.S. dollars on average. When comparing the top and bottom two traders observed in
t by their combined average mean TM per bushel in U.S. dollars, the results show that the
difference between those two groups is 0.04 U.S. dollars per bushel. The two top traders
observed in t achieve an average mean TM of 0.29 U.S. dollars per bushel in t+1, while the two
bottom traders observed in t achieve a mean TM of 0.25 U.S. dollars per bushel in t+1. Turning
to the statistical comparison in table 9, the top and bottom two traders’ performances in t+1
reveal that the quarterly time horizon performance does differ statistically from zero. The top and
bottom trader's 0.21 U.S. dollar TM difference in t+1 is significant at the 0.05% level for the
quarterly data. The t-test has a p-value of 0.0146 and the Wilcoxon test has a p-value of 0.0182.
The quarterly comparison of the top and bottom two combined average mean TMs per U.S.
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dollars per bushel in t+1 shows mixed evidence of a statistical difference. The t-test indicates the
TM difference is significant at the 10% but not at the 5% level (p-value 0.0529), while the
Wilcoxon p-value of 0.125 indicates no statistical difference at the 10% significance level.

Summary Quarterly Results
The results of the quarterly data show that the ranking of the traders by the mean TM is
not random. But the magnitude of the differences is only significant when comparing the top and
bottom one trader when comparing the performance, measured in the mean TM, in two
consecutive quarters. The difference is insignificant when comparing the top two trader's
combined average mean TM to the bottom two trader's combined average mean TM in t+1. This
would suggest, superior trading skill is only evident at the extreme tail of the trader performance
distribution. The descriptive statistics show that the average mean TM was positive for all traders
besides trader 6, who averaged a 0 average mean TM. Five out of the 14 traders in the dataset
achieved an average mean TM of over 0.2 U.S. dollars for the quarters in which they were
receiving purchases.

Yearly Results
Table 2 shows the average mean results for the descriptive statistics of the yearly data,
and table 10 shows more detailed results of the yearly mean TMs. When looking at the average
mean TMs of the years when the traders received orders, the table reveals that trader 12 is the
most profitable trader with an average mean TM of 0.36 U.S. dollars per bushel per year. On the
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other hand, trader 6 ranked in the bottom position with a slightly negative average mean TM of 0.01 U.S. dollars per bushel.

Yearly Winner and Loser Rank Test Results
The pooled yearly winner and loser rank test for the ranking of traders by mean TMs
comprises five-period brackets from 2012 to 2017. Table 11 shows the distribution of winners
and losers in t and t+1 per two-year brackets with the total number of active traders in the twoyear bracket. The pooled counts of the placements from Table 11 can be found in Table 12. The
pooled table reveals that three out of the ten traders who were winners in t were again winners in
t+1, revealing a conditional probability of a winner being a repeat winner of 30%. More winners
in t were turned into losers in t+1 than winners being able to repeat their success. Out of the ten
winners in t, seven turned into losers in t+1, representing a 70% conditional probability of being
a winner in t and a loser in t+1. Out of the total ten losers in t, six turned into winners in t+1. The
conditional probability of losers in t becoming winners in t+1 is 60%. Out of ten initial losers in
t, three could not improve their ranking. They stayed in the losing category, which means the
conditional probability of being a loser in t and repeating the bottom ranking is 30%.
The pooled counts of the rankings for the yearly data do not look to be evenly distributed
at first. The Fisher's exact test revealed a two-sided p-value of 0.1789, as Table 13 shows. At the
5% significance level, the Fisher's exact test H0 of a random ranking of the traders' performance
cannot be rejected. The yearly results, unlike the quarterly results, indicate no consistency in
superior trader performance.
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Yearly Top and Bottom Performance Test Results
First, the top and bottom performance test calculates the mean TM per trader in t+1 while
the traders are ranked based on their performance in t. Table 14 shows the mean TMs in t+1 for
each top and bottom-ranked trader of t and the combined mean TMs of the top two and bottom
two traders on a yearly basis. The comparison results of the top and bottom traders can be found
in Table 15. The results table shows that the yearly average mean TM in t+1 for the top-ranked
trader of t was 0.09 U.S. dollars per bushel. On the other side, the average mean TM in t+1 for
the bottom-ranked trader in t was 0.33 U.S. dollars per bushel. This larger average mean TM
means that a trader who ranked bottom in the first year was on average 0.24 U.S. dollars per
bushel more profitable in t+1 than the top-ranked trader in t+1. The same can be observed for the
yearly analysis when looking at the combined average mean TMs for the top two traders of t in
t+1, and the combined average mean TM of the bottom two traders of t in t+1. This is evidence
of performance reversal and indicates that superior performance is not consistent for traders.
While not as big of a difference as the top and bottom one trader, the bottom two ranked
traders in t, achieve an average of 0.18 U.S. dollars per bushel more TM than the two traders
ranked on top in t. The combined average mean TM in t+1 for the top two traders of t is 0.12
U.S. dollars per bushel and therefore higher than the average mean TM of 0.09 U.S. dollars per
bushel in t+1 for the top one trader in t. This difference and the larger combined average mean
TM of the top two traders compared to the top one trader in t indicate that the second-ranked
trader in t outperforms the top trader of t in t+1. Comparing the top and bottom traders with the
paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test reveals no significant difference in the performance
of the top and bottom trader in t+1 at the 5% significance level. But both tests, the t-test p-value
is 0.065, and the Wilcoxon p-value is 0.063, are significant at the 10% level. When comparing
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the performance in t+1 of the107 two top and bottom traders on a yearly level, the t-statistic
value of 0.0529 is barely insignificant at the 5% significance level. Still, the Wilcoxon p-value
also misses the significance level of 10%, as the p-value of 0.125 shows. The results make it
difficult to decline the H0 of no difference in trader performance in t+1 based on their ranking in
t. While the yearly results do not indicate a difference in the achieved TM per bushel at the 5%
level, it can't be denied that they do differ at slightly higher significance levels. However,
importantly, given that we find evidence of performance reversal, our results indicate that traders
are unable to display superior trading skills over longer periods.

Summary Yearly Results
The pooled winner and loser rank test results show that the traders' ranking is random for
the yearly data. Also, the top and bottom performance test did not show a strong significance for
the magnitude of the difference between the top and bottom traders. Similar to the quarterly
results, the average mean TM per year ranks from -0.01 U.S. dollars per bushel at the bottom to
0.36 U.S. dollars per bushel per year at the top.

Comparison of Results
Comparing the results from the quarterly rankings to the yearly rankings of traders, we
only find significance of trader ranking for the quarterly periods. These results show that the
ranking of traders is random for the yearly data. While traders may repeat their ranking in two
consecutive quarters, they may not be able to repeatedly rank in the same spot for more than two
consecutive quarters repeatedly. When comparing the average mean TMs per bushel, the results
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show that for the quarterly data, the top trader in t has a significant advantage in t+1 over the
bottom trader in t. But the results lose significance when even comparing the performance of the
top two traders to the bottom two traders of t in t+1. For the more extended periods of the yearly
data, the magnitude in the difference between the top and bottom traders in t is not significant in
t+1. But even while not significant, the bottom traders from t now outperform the top trader in
t+1. These results indicate that traders can not constantly outperform each other in the longer
run. When comparing the descriptive statistics of mean TMs over the whole dataset (table 1), the
numbers look different from the descriptive statistics for the yearly or quarterly average data.
When looking at the single trades regardless of the time period, the top trader, trader 11, achieves
a 0.27 U.S. dollars average TM per bushel per trade. This number is lower than the top average
mean TM of either the yearly or quarterly data. Additionally, from all three descriptive statistics
tables, the top-ranked traders have higher standard deviations than the lower-ranked traders,
which may indicate higher risk-taking.

Gender Performance Results
First, it has to be noted that the small number of female traders to male traders in the
dataset makes it hard to draw definitive conclusions about gender differences. Still, we found it
interesting to compare traders' performance split by gender to the literature. For a fair
comparison of the two types of traders, 2017 trades alone were compared. All trades that
occurred in 2017 are accounted for, and they are not split into quarters. The number of trades
done by females and males in 2017 was nearly equal, even though only three out of the ten
traders were female. Females' total number of trades performed in 2017 was 2,980, and male
traders made 2,819 trades. A more detailed division of the traders and their trades in 2017 can be
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found in table 16. The average TM of all trades set up by females is 0.17 U.S. dollars per bushel,
while the average male TM was 0.09 U.S. dollars per bushel. On average, females achieved a
0.08 U.S. dollars better TM per bushel than their male colleagues. The folded F-test did not
support the null hypothesis of homogeneity of variances. The rejection of the assumption of
homogeneity of variances points to the Satterthwaite t statistic being the practical test to test if
male and female performance difference is statistically significant. The p-value 0<.0001 of the
Satterthwaite t-test indicates that the difference between the female and male transactions in
2017 is strongly significant, even at the 1% level. The results of the statistical analysis are
presented in table 17.
However, when comparing gender differences in trading performance for the whole
dataset, male traders are more successful in generating a higher average mean TM per bushel.
Descriptive statistics over of the traders split by gender are in table 18. Over the whole period,
there are 3,633 transactions initiated by female traders and 25,556 transactions initiated by male
traders. Overall, the males achieved an average TM of 0.1879 U.S. dollars per bushel, and the
female traders 0.1574 U.S. dollars per bushel. On average, the male traders are 0.0305 U.S.
dollars more profitable than the female traders. The difference is significant at the 5% level, as
shown in table 19.
Overall, our results provide mixed evidence as to differences in trading performance
across gender, and the small number of female traders in our sample means it is not possible to
generalize our results and make any definitive conclusions.
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Influence of Experience on Trader Performance Results
To compare trader experience, the year 2017 was chosen to focus on all trades that
occurred during a single year to account for best comparability. Traders were split into two
groups based on their work experience in 2017. The first group comprises all six traders with
three years or less of work experience in 2017. The second group had four years or more of work
experience and consisted of four individual traders. A table of the traders with their experience
can be found in table 20. The trader group with three years or less of work experience had 3,357
trades in 2017, and the more experienced trader group accumulated 2,442 trades in the same
year. The less-experienced traders outperformed the more experienced traders by on average
0.101 U.S. dollars per bushel in 2017. While the more experienced group averaged 0.075 U.S.
dollars per bushel in TM, the less experienced group achieved an average TM of 0.176 U.S.
dollars per bushel. The folded F-test result led to the rejectiona of the assumption of
homogeneity of variances for the two groups. With a p-value of <.0001, the p-value of the folded
F-test pointed towards the use of the Satterthwaite estimation for the t-statistic. The Satterthwaite
p-value of <.0001 shows that the difference between the less experienced and more experienced
traders is strongly significant at the 1% significance level. Results of the statistical analysis for
the experience level are in table 21.
As for the gender comparisons, it has to be highlighted that the small number of traders
does not allow a generalization of our results. At the same time, it is possible that the results are
random and would have turned out differently if a different year had been chosen. In our case, it
may be possible that the less experienced traders took on more risky trades and were rewarded
for their risk-taking. From table 17 it can be seen that the standard deviation of TM for the less
experienced traders was higher (0.3175) than for the experienced traders (0.2868).
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Discussion
The results of the winner and loser rank test show mixed signals. For the shorter term, the
quarterly data shows persistent trader ranking. Whereas those results cannot be observed for the
longer yearly time horizon.
Looking at the difference in magnitude of the top and bottom traders, the top and bottom
performance test only show significance at the 5% level for the top and bottom trader
comparison for the quarterly period. Here the top trader was on average 0.21 dollars per bushel
more profitable than the bottom trader. The difference in magnitude for the yearly TMs is
significantly different at the 10% level for the top and bottom traders, but in this case, the bottom
trader outperforms the top trader by, on average, 0.24 dollars. This result does not support the
idea of consistently superior trader performance, but instead shows evidence of performance
reversal. The gender tests are strongly significant and show that the female traders outperform
their male coworkers by, on average, 0.08 dollars per bushel. Unfortunately, the result is not
generalizable due to the small number of traders. The generally accepted theory of overconfident
male traders in behavioral finance (Barber & Odean, 2001) can not be tested here, as commercial
purchases differ from stock market trading. At the same time, several studies find no significant
difference in trading behavior for males and females who are professionals in the financial world
(Atkinson et al., 2003; Dwyer et al., 2002). It may be possible that the female traders engaged in
less risky foreward trades compared to the male trader, who may have suffered losses from
engaging in riskier trades which may be in line with findings of women being more risk-averse
(Byrnes et al., 1999; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Nofsinger, 2017).
Our experience comparison revealed surprisingly that the less experienced group of
traders outperformed the experienced traders on average by 0.10 dollars per bushel. While these
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results are not conclusive for the whole population of commercial grain traders, our results to be
at odds with theory from the behavioral finance literature, which suggests trader experience is
positively correlated with performance (Hoffmann, Post, & Pennings, 2015b; Nicolosi et al.,
2009). However, it may be possible that the experienced traders exhibited less risky behavior
when engaging in forward contracts and hence achieved smaller average TMs – a classic riskreturn tradeoff.

Limitations and Recommendations
The study was performed with a dataset consisting of a small number of traders. It would
be interesting to compare the performance of more grain merchants, possibly working for
different companies. Further, it would be interesting to test the performance of grain traders for
different commodities, as this dataset only included corn and soybean transactions. It may also
be of interest to understand the performance of other market participants, such as the producers.
Understanding the producer performance and the behavior leading to the performance would
allow the creation of targeted programs to educate producers and create information tools to
further the education of all market participants. Finally, the gender and experience comparisons
were performed for only one year of trading activity due to the limited data. A longer time frame
would be ideal.

Conclusion
While past performance can indicate future performance in the short term, these findings
could not be observed for our study for the yearly time horizon. Both results from the gender and
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experience comparisons were unexpected, which shows that commercial traders in a riskmanagement setting cannot be directly compared to stock traders or non-commercial speculators.
The results prove that further research is needed to better understand the behavior of all market
participants in the agricultural field. With a better understanding of market participants behavior,
government spending could be used more effectively to educate all market participants and
ultimately make markets fairer and more efficient.
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Tables

Table 1
Mean TM per trader over the whole dataset
Trader
11
1
10
2
4
12
13
9
7
5
8
3
6

Mean TM
0.27
0.27
0.26
0.26
0.24
0.23
0.22
0.18
0.18
0.16
0.13
0.11
0.03

Std Dev
0.47
0.53
0.18
0.53
0.53
0.38
0.21
0.17
0.27
0.52
0.7
0.15
0.19

n
3745
1638
375
933
2391
1803
546
4
282
9537
7000
18
1266

Table 2
Mean TM per Trader per year
Trader
12
2
4
11
10
1
9
3
7
13
8
5
6

Mean TM
0.36
0.3
0.29
0.26
0.26
0.23
0.18
0.18
0.15
0.14
0.12
0.12
-0.01

Std Dev
0.44
0.28
0.29
0.1
0
0.18
0.2
0.13
0.1
0.1
0.14
0.11
0.06

n
4
4
4
6
2
7
2
2
2
4
4
8
2
45

Table 3
Mean TM per Trader per quarter
Trader
2
4
12
11
1
9
10
7
13
8
5
3
6

Mean TM
0.36
0.33
0.26
0.25
0.24
0.18
0.18
0.16
0.16
0.14
0.14
0.13
0

Std Dev
0.48
0.29
0.34
0.13
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.03
0.08
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.05

n
12
11
8
21
23
2
4
2
7
12
26
3
5
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Table 4
Detailed mean TM per trader per quarter
Mean TM per Quarter (delivery)
Trader

eight

eleven

five

four

nine

Q01 Q02 Q03 Q04 Q05 Q06 Q07 Q08 Q09 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max

0 -0 -0 0.2
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
38 161 189 180
-1 -1 -1 -1
0.5 0.6 0.5 1.3

0.1
0.4
219
-2
1.1

0.1
0.2
3
-0
0.3
0
0.3
283
-1
0.9

Mean

0.3 0.3 0.4

-0

-0

Std
N
Min
Max
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max

0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.1
147 198 180 154 145 135 111 55 51 14
6
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0.2 0.2
1.3 1.2 1.4 1.1 0.5 1.1 2.6
2 1.8 1.8 0.5

0.2
0.2
8
0
0.6
0.1
0.4
322
-1
1.1

0.4
0.8
34
-1
2.3
0.6
0.9
298
-2
2.9

0.5
0.6
104
-2
1.7
0.5
0.8
427
-2
2.6

0.5
0.5
148
-1
2.5
0.3
0.5
424
-1
1.3

0.4
0.4
159
-1
2
0.1
0.4
454
-1
1.2

0.4
0.8
40
-1
2.6
0.2
0.6
232
-2
2.3
0.2
0.6
365
-1
3.3

0.1
2
270
-5
3.6
0.5
1
160
-1
3.8
0.3
0.9
392
-6
4.6

0
0.7
329
-2
2
0.1
0.3
183
-1
0.7
0.1
0.4
356
-2
1.9

0.1
0.4
336
-2
1.2
0.2
0.3
199
-0
1
0.1
0.3
359
-1
0.6

0.2
0.3
357
-1
0.9
0.1
0.3
228
-2
0.6
0.2
0.3
347
-1
0.7

0.1
0.4
344
-1
1.7
0.3
0.3
208
-0
1
0.1
0.3
411
-1
0.8

0.2
0.4
357
-1
1.3
0.3
0.3
208
-0
1
0.1
0.4
367
-1
1.2

0.2
0.4
357
-0
1.3
0.1
0.2
181
-0
1.2
0.1
0.4
310
-1
1.1

0.2
0.4
337
-0
1.4
0.1
0.2
192
-0
0.7
0
0.4
248
-1
0.6

0.3
0.5
280
-1
2.6
0.2
0.2
200
-0
0.8
0.1
0.3
298
-1
0.7

0
0.4
302
-1
1.2
0.2
0.2
198
-0
0.8
0.1
0.2
306
-0
0.7

-0
0.3
191
-1
1.1
0.2
0.2
198
-0
0.7
0.1
0.2
355
-0
0.6

0.2
0.2
147
-0
0.7
0.1
0.1
292
-0
0.7

0.3
0.2
97
-0
0.7
0.1
0.1
131
-0
0.7

0.3
0.2
85
-0
0.7
0.1
0.1
107
-0
0.9

-0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.4

0 0.3
0.1
1
2
0 0.3
0 0.4
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Table 4 (cont.)
Mean TM per Quarter (delivery)
Trader

one

seven

six

ten

thirteen

Q01 Q02 Q03 Q04 Q05 Q06 Q07 Q08 Q09 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max

0.1 -0 -0 0.1
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
104 133 138 126
-1 -1 -1 -1
0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8

0.3
0.3
140
-1
0.9

0.2
0.3
109
-0
0.9

0.3
0.3
122
-0
0.9

0.9
0.8
143
-0
3.2

0.7
0.9
181
-1
2.8

0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
161 115 59 58 20
5
2
-1 -1 -0 -0 -0 0.2
0
1.1
1 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.2

0.3 0.5
0
2
1
0.3 0.5
0.3 0.5

0.5

0 0.2
0
1
2
1
0.5
0 0.2
0.5 0.1 0.2

-0
0.2
9
-0
0.3

0.1
1
0.1
0.1

0.1 0.1
0.2
1 24
0.1 -0
0.1 0.6

0.1
0.2
127
-1
0.5
-0
0
2
-0
-0
0.1
0.2
72
-1
0.6

-0 0.3

0
0.2
210
-1
0.5
0.3
0.2
65
-0
0.7
0.2
0.2
111
-0
0.7

1
-0
-0
0.1
0.1
15
-0
0.3
0
0.2
219
-1
0.6
0.3
0.2
179
-0
0.8
0.2
0.2
157
-0
1

1
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.3
126
-1
0.8
-0
0.2
68
-1
0.3
0.3
0.2
129
-0
0.7
0.2
0.2
179
-0
0.7

48

Table 4 (cont.)
Mean TM per Quarter (delivery)
Trader

three

twelve

two

Q01 Q02 Q03 Q04 Q05 Q06 Q07 Q08 Q09 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max
Mean
Std
N
Min
Max

0.3
1
0.3
0.3

0.2 -0
0.1 0.1
5
3
0.1 -0
0.4
0
1
1
1
1

0.2
0
0 0.2
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
107 160 162 159
-1 -1 -1 -1
0.8 0.9
1 1.2

0.4 0.5 0.9 1.5 0.6 0.2 -0 -0
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4
154 79 38 10 19 32 10
2
-1 -0 -0 0.2 0.1 -0 -1 -1
1.1 1.1 1.4 2.3 1.4 0.4 0.2 -0

0
0 -0
0.2 0.2 0.2
19 54 48
-1 -0 -1
0.4 0.5 0.2

0.4
0.5
147
-1
1.5

0.4
0.5
228
-1
1.5

0.2
0.3
226
-1
1.5

0.1
0.2
179
-0
0.5
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Table 5
Winner and loser rankings for quarterly data based on average TM
t

t+1

Q02

Q03

Q03

Q04

Q04

Q05

Q05

Q06

Q06

Q07

Q07

Q08

Q08

Q09

Q09

Q10

Q10

Q11

Q11

Q12

Q12

Q13

Q13

Q14

Q14

Q15

Q15

Q16

Q18

Q19

Q20

Q21

Q21

Q22

Q22

Q23

Q23

Q24

Q24

Q25

winner t+1 loser t+1
winner t

2

0

loser t

0

2

winner t

2

0

loser t

0

2

winner t

1

1

loser t

1

1

winner t

2

0

loser t

0

2

winner t

2

0

loser t

0

2

winner t

2

0

loser t

0

1

winner t

2

0

loser t

0

2

winner t

0

2

loser t

1

0

winner t

2

0

loser t

0

2

winner t

1

0

loser t

1

1

winner t

0

2

loser t

2

0

winner t

1

1

loser t

1

1

winner t

1

1

loser t

1

1

winner t

0

2

loser t

2

0

winner t

1

1

loser t

1

1

winner t

2

0

loser t

0

2

winner t

0

1

loser t

0

1

winner t

0

0

loser t

1

1

winner t

1

0

loser t

1

1

winner t

1

1

loser t

1

1

N
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
6
4
4
4
4
4
4
6
7
6
5
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Table 6
Pooled winner and loser rank test frequency table for quarterly data Based on average TM
per Trader
Frequency
Percent
Row Pct
Col Pct
Winner t

Loser t

Total

Winner
t+1

Loser t+1

Total

23
31.94
65.71
63.89
13
18.06
35.14
36.11
36
50

12
16.67
34.29
33.33
24
33.33
64.86
66.67
36
50

35
48.61

37
51.39

72
100

Table 7
Results of the Fisher’s exact test results for pooled quarterly data
Cell (1,1) Frequency (F)
Left-sided Pr <= F
Right-sided Pr >= F

23
0.9978
0.0089

Table Probability (P)
Two-sided Pr <= P

0.0067
0.0178
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Table 8
Average TMs of the top and bottom traders for the quarterly data
Average TM t+1 in
USD per bu

Average TM t+1 in
USD per bu

Quarter

Topranked
trader in t

Bottomranked
trader in t

Quarter

Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
Q22
Q23
Q24
Average

0.26
0.39
-0.1
0.53
0.88
1.5
0.58
0.17
0.69
0.36
0.11
0.08
0.4
0.11
0.02
0.46
0.51
0.32
0.04
0.16
0.38
0.22
0.37

-0.09
0.17
0.32
-0.01
-0.02
0.73
0.47
0.52
0.06
-0.29
0.49
0.04
0.06
0.23
0.06
0.09
0.03
0.04
-0.09
0.35
0.25
0.04
0.16

Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
Q22
Q23
Q24
Average

Average
Average
top two
bottom two
traders in t traders in t
0.14
0.3
0.16
0.36
0.52
1.21
0.66
0.2
0.53
0.27
0.14
0.1
0.27
0.11
0.08
0.3
0.33
0.26
0.04
0.13
0.1
0.24
0.29

-0.07
0.2
0.25
0.02
0.06
0.93
0.73
0.55
-0.02
0.09
0.57
0.24
0.19
0.33
0.32
0.25
0.13
0.17
0.08
0.23
0.16
0.09
0.25
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Table 9
Top and bottom rank test of grain traders for the quarterly data
USD per bu

Average t-statistic
TM t+1 p-value

Top trader
Bottom trader

0.37
0.16

Top 2 traders average
Bottom 2 traders average

0.29
0.25

Top versus Bottom
Top 2 versus Bottom 2

0.21
0.04

0.0146
0.0529

Wilxocon
p-value

0.0182
0.125
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Table 10
Descriptive Statistics of average TM per trader by year
Mean TM per Year (delivery)
2012

2011
Trader
eight
eleven
five
four
nine
one
seven
six
ten
thirteen
three
twelve
two

Mean Std

-0 0.2
0

N

Min Max Mean Std

N

Min Max Mean Std

2013
N

2014
Min Max Mean Std

0.25
0.42 0.6 351 -2.3 2.3 0.41
58 -0.6 0.5 0.03 0.4 1414 -1.7 1.3 0.24 0.7 2058 -2.1 2.9 0.23
1
0
0 0.2 0.5 1450 -1.3 1.4 0.26 0.6 842 -1.1 2.6 0.69

0.07 0.3 140 -0.8 0.6

Min Max

1.6 864 -5.3 3.6
0.7 1102 -2.4 3.8
0.7 2141 -5.9 4.6
0.6 98 -0.3 1.8

0.1 0.4 538 -1.1 0.9 0.56 0.7 573 -1.1 3.2 0.14 0.3 361 -0.9 1.1

0.27
0.21 0.4 150 -0.9 0.8

N

0

2 0.27 0.3

0.19 0.5 626

-1 1.2 0.72 0.6 123 -0.4 2.3

0.09 0.2

16 -0.1 0.4

0.1 0.2

34 -0.7 0.3
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Table 10 (cont.)
Mean TM per Year (delivery)
2016

2015
Trader
eight
eleven
five
four
nine
one
seven
six
ten
thirteen
three
twelve
two

Mean Std

N

Min Max Mean Std

N

Min Max Mean Std

2017
N

2018
Min Max Mean Std

0.08 0.4 2760 -2.1 1.7
0.2 0.4 2578 -1.1 2.6 -0.1 0.4 798
-1 1.2
0.17 0.3 857 -1.7
1 0.18 0.3 770 -0.4 1.2 0.2 0.2 598 -0.5 0.7 0.24 0.2
0.15 0.3 1579 -1.9 1.9 0.09 0.3 1187
-1 1.1 0.11 0.2 1042 -0.3 0.7 0.1 0.1

0.31 0.2

17 -0.1 0.7

0.05

0

2 0.05 0.1

1

0

2

1

0.31 0.2

0.06 0.1

0.03
5 0.03 0.5 0.09
0.08
0.03
0.26
8
0 0.2 0.22

0
2 0.03
0.2
4 -0.2
0.1 74 -0.2
0.2 1210 -0.7
0.2 301 -0.1
0.2 409 -0.5

1 0.03 0.2 192 -0.7 0.5 0.28 0.4 1361

0
0.3
0.3
0.6
0.8
1

0.32 0.1
0.22
-0.1
0.26
0.23

N

Min Max

67 -0.3 0.6
58 -0.1 0.9
2 0.26 0.4

0.3 208
-1 0.8
0.2 56 -0.3 0.3
0.2 74 -0.3 0.7
0.2 127 -0.2 0.6

-1 1.5 0.12 0.2 248 -0.3 0.5
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Table 11
Winner and loser rankings for yearly data based on average TM
t

t+1

2012

2013

2013

2014

2014

2015

2015

2016

2016

2017

winner t
loser t
winner t
loser t
winner t
loser t
winner t
loser t
winner t
loser t

winner t+1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
2

loser t+1
1
1
2
0
1
1
1
1
2
0

N
4
5
4
6
6

Table 12
Pooled Winner and Loser Rank Test Frequency Table for Yearly Data Based on Average
TM per Trader
Frequency
Percent
Row Pct
Col Pct
Winner t

Loser t

Total

Winner t+1

Loser t+1

Total

3
15.79
30
33.33
6
31.58
66.67
66.67
9
47.37

7
36.84
70
70
3
15.79
33.33
30
10
52.63

10
52.63

9
47.37

19
100
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Table 13
Results of the Fisher’s exact test for pooled yearly data
Cell (1,1) Frequency (F)
Left-sided Pr <= F
Right-sided Pr >= F

3
0.1276
0.9815

Table Probability (P)
Two-sided Pr <= P

0.1091
0.1789

Table 14
Average TMs of the top and bottom traders for the yearly data
Average TM t+1 in
USD per bu
Year
2012
2013
2015
2016
2017
Average

Topranked
trader in t

Bottomranked
traders in t

0.09
0.10
0.17
0.03
0.09
0.09

0.33
0.69
0.31
0.06
0.28
0.33

Average TM t+1 in
in USD per bu
Year
2012
2013
2015
2016
2017
Average

Average
top two
traders in t

Average
bottom two
traders in t

0.17
0.12
0.13
0.17
0.01
0.12

0.45
0.45
0.23
0.13
0.25
0.30
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Table 15
Top and bottom rank test of grain traders for the quarterly data
tAverag
statisti
e TM
c pt+1
value
0.09
0.33

USD per bu
Top trader
Bottom trader
Top 2 trader’s average
Bottom 2 trader’s average

0.12
0.3

Top versus Bottom
Top 2 versus Bottom 2

-0.24
-0.18

0.0649
0.0529

Wilxoco
n p-value

0.0625
0.125

Table 16
Average TM for 2017 by gender and trader
Gender
female

male

Trader
six
thirteen
twelve
eight
eleven
five
nine
one
seven
ten

Mean
0.03
0.22
0.28
-0.07
0.2
0.11
0.03
0.09
0.08
0.26

TM (USD per bu)
Std
N
Min
0.19
1210
-0.72
0.21
409
-0.53
0.41
1361
-0.98
0.39
798
-1.04
0.2
598
-0.45
0.15
1042
-0.25
0
2
0.03
0.2
4
-0.17
0.14
74
-0.18
0.18
301
-0.12

Max
0.62
1.04
1.52
1.21
0.72
0.7
0.03
0.3
0.34
0.79
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Table 17
T-test of Trader Gender Performance for 2017 Based on Average TM per Bushel
Variable: TM in USD per bu
Gender
Female
Male
Diff (1-2)

N

Gender
Female
Male
Diff (1-2)
Diff (1-2)

Method

2980
2819

Mean
0.1697
0.0945
0.0752

Pooled
Satterthwaite

Mean
0.1697
0.0945
0.0752
0.0752

Std Dev
0.3298
0.2802
0.3067

Std Err Minimum Maximum
0.00604 -0.9812
1.5233
0.00528 -1.0437
1.2074
0.00806

95% CL Mean
0.1579 0.1816
0.0842 0.1049
0.0594 0.091
0.0595 0.0909

Method
Pooled
Satterthwaite

Variances
Equal
Unequal

Method
Folded F

Equality of Variances
Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F
2979
2818
1.39
<.0001

Std Dev
0.3298
0.2802
0.3067

95% CL Std Dev
0.3216 0.3384
0.2731 0.2877
0.3012 0.3124

DF
t Value Pr > |t|
5797
9.33
<.0001
5731.9
9.38
<.0001
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Table 18
Average TM by gender and trader for the whole dataset
Gender

Trader

six
thirteen
Female
three
twelve
eight
eleven
five
four
Male nine
one
seven
ten
two

Mean
0.03
0.22
0.11
0.23
0.13
0.27
0.16
0.24
0.18
0.27
0.18
0.26
0.26

TM (USD per bu)
Std
N
Min
0.19
1266
-0.72
0.21
546
-0.53
0.15
18
-0.11
0.38
1803
-0.98
0.7
7000
-5.26
0.47
3745
-2.36
0.52
9537
-5.94
0.53
2391
-1.32
0.17
4
0.03
0.53
1638
-1.11
0.27
282
-0.99
0.18
375
-0.27
0.53
933
-1.03

Max
0.62
1.04
0.4
1.52
3.61
3.75
4.56
2.58
0.38
3.19
0.76
0.79
2.26
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Table 19
T-test of Trader gender performance based on average TM over the whole dataset
Variable: TM in USD per bu
Gender

N

Mean

Female
Male
Diff (1-2)

3633
25556

0.1574
0.1879
-0.0305

Gender
Female
Male
Diff (1-2)
Diff (1-2)

Method

Std Dev
0.3128
0.5682
0.543

Mean

Pooled
Satterthwaite

Method

Variances

Pooled
Satterthwaite

Equal
Unequal

Std Err

Minimum

0.00519
0.00355
0.00963

-0.9812
-5.9438

95% CL Mean

0.1574
0.1879
-0.0305
-0.0305

DF

0.1472
0.181
-0.0494
-0.0429

t Value

29187
7601.4

-3.17
-4.85

Std Dev

0.1676
0.1949
-0.0117
-0.0182

0.3128
0.5682
0.543

Maximum
1.5233
4.5616

95% CL Std Dev
0.3058
0.5633
0.5387

0.3202
0.5732
0.5475

Pr > |t|
0.0015
<.0001

Equality of Variances
Method
Folded F

Num DF
25555

Den DF
3632

F Value
3.3

Pr > F
<.0001
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Table 20
Average TM for 2017 by experience and trader
Experience

Three years
or less

Four years
or more

Trader
nine
seven
six
ten
thirteen
twelve
eight
eleven
five
one

Mean
0.03
0.08
0.03
0.26
0.22
0.28
-0.07
0.2
0.11
0.09

TM (USD per bu)
Std
N
Min
0
2
0.03
0.14
74
-0.18
0.19
1210
-0.72
0.18
301
-0.12
0.21
409
-0.53
0.41
1361
-0.98
0.39
798
-1.04
0.2
598
-0.45
0.15
1042
-0.25
0.2
4
-0.17

Max
0.03
0.34
0.62
0.79
1.04
1.52
1.21
0.72
0.7
0.3
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Table 21
T-test of Trader experience for 2017 based on average TM
Variable: TM in USD per bu
Trader Experience
3 years or less
4 years or more
Diff (1-2)

N

Mean

Std Dev

Std Err

Minimum

Maximum

3357
2442

0.1757
0.0747
0.1009

0.3175
0.2868
0.305

0.00548
0.0058
0.00811

-0.9812
-1.0437

1.5233
1.2074

TraderExperience
Method
3 years or less
4 years or more
Diff (1-2)
Pooled
Diff (1-2)
Satterthwaite

Mean
95% CL Mean Std Dev
0.1757 0.1649 0.1864 0.3175
0.0747 0.0634 0.0861 0.2868
0.1009 0.085 0.1168
0.305
0.1009 0.0853 0.1166

Method
Pooled
Satterthwaite

Variances
Equal
Unequal

DF
5797
5534

Method
Folded F

Equality of Variances
Num DF Den DF
3356
2441

t Value
12.44
12.64

F Value
1.23

95% CL Std Dev
0.3101
0.3253
0.279
0.2951
0.2995
0.3106

Pr > |t|
<.0001
<.0001

Pr > F
<.0001
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Do Reference Points Impact Forward Trading Behavior?
Abstract
A Two-way panel data model is applied to test the use of reference points of commercial
agricultural commodity traders in their purchasing decisions. We test if either the total amount of
bushels purchased by a specific trader for a specific feed mill location or the length of forward
contracts are influenced by either the basis or the previous performance of the specific trader. We
use monthly and quarterly time horizons. Our study differs from most other studies in the field of
trading that focuses on either institutional investors or private speculators by investigating the
behavior of commercial commodity traders in a risk-management setting. The traders in this
study do not use their own wealth when engaging in a trade but are responsible for the steady
input supply to avoid interrupting the feed supply chain for meat manufacturing companies.
Results from our analysis indicate that traders do not change the amount of bushels purchased
based on basis levels for their market locations, nor based on their trading performance in the
previous period. However, we find that traders are influenced by the basis levels for their market
locations when deciding on the contract length of forward purchases.

Keywords: futures markets; forward contracts; commodity purchasing
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Introduction
Findings in behavioral finance have discovered that if many traders suffer from the same
psychological bias, it can affect markets (Coakley, Dollery, & Kellard, 2011; Coval & Shumway,
2005; Nofsinger, 2018). Such findings highlight the increasing importance of studying the
conscious and unconscious decision-making progress of all market participants.
Capitalist societies depend on functioning markets for the trade of goods and services. A
unique role is often assigned to agricultural markets to guarantee food security. Food security is
also why agriculture is a primary focus of policymakers who often allocate large budgets for the
functioning of a country's agricultural sector. Until the second half of the twentieth century, the
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) by Eugene Fama (1970) and the expected utility theory were
the dominating theories to study the behavior of market participants. Fama defined a market as
efficient when prices reflect all available information entirely at all times. Under the EMH, no
market participant can systematically beat the market. Later in the 2nd half of the 20th century,
the EMH and its underlying assumptions were challenged, leading to behavioral economics'
emergence (Shleifer, 2000).
The publication of prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979 has been a
significant milestone for the field of behavioral economics and raised continued interest in the
understanding of human behavior in financial markets. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) described
that prospect theory focuses on reference points and problem representation to code outcomes of
gambles as losses or gains. Further, prospect theory showed how humans value gains and losses
differently, as previously assumed by the EMH. Ultimately, the value function of prospect theory
can be described as being S-shaped, concave in shape for gains, and convex for losses, with the
loss side being steeper than the gains side. The shape of the value functions leads to asymmetric
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decision-making based on losses looming larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Two
biases resulting from prospect theory's value function are loss aversion (Thaler, Tversky,
Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997) and the disposition effect (Shefrin & Statman, 1985).
While many discoveries have been made so far about behavior and the decision-making
process in the financial field in general, findings in the field of commodity trading are sparser.
Commodity markets, especially for soft commodities or agricultural products, follow rules that
do not necessarily apply to other markets. For example, agricultural products are usually
seasonal and perishable, which is unique in financial markets, especially compared to stocks.
Additionally, commodity contracts on futures exchanges are traded with contracts that specify
and standardize the trades. All transactions on futures exchanges have a buy or sell obligation for
an exchange at a date in the future. Traditionally, futures market transactions for commodities
serve a risk management purpose in the form of hedging. Moreover, similarly, forward contracts
for the physical exchange of commodities help producers and purchasers lock in a price to sell or
buy the product. An agreed-upon price helps both sides, buyers, and sellers achieve planning
certainty and reduce financial risk.

Background
This research focuses on the behavior of commodity traders employed by a firm
producing livestock feed for the manufacturing of meat products. In this case, only corn
transactions are considered as an input factor to the feed products. Profit margins in meat
production are typically tight (Martin, Smith & Smith, 2016), making profitable feed input
purchases critical to the firms' overall profitability. To manage the price risk, the traders in the
focus of this study use different contracts to lock in purchase prices of corn for future deliveries.
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Those three contract types are futures contracts, forward contracts, and basis contracts. The
trading team of the firm consists of two groups. The first group are traders that focus on
transactions in the futures market. Futures market traders have a specific skill set in timing
transactions in the futures market and purchasing futures positions with the target to mitigate
price risk. Those traders timing the futures market purchases are not the focus of this study. The
behavior of the grain traders in the second group, who are the focus of this study, have skills that
may not be easily compared to traders in other markets, such as the financial market. For
example, traders in commercial grain trading are using basis rather than the price to evaluate
transactions.
Basis (Bt) represents the difference between the commodity's cash price (CPt) and the
respective futures price (FPt):
𝐵𝑡 = 𝐶𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝑃𝑡

(1)

The basis represents different costs to bring the commodity to a specific market at a
particular time. For example, when the futures price for the May contract for corn is trading at
$4.90 and the cash price in Purdy, MO is $4.50, the basis is -$0.40, the basis is 40 cents under
the May futures. If the cash price were $5.00, the basis would be 10 cents over May in the same
scenario. Fuel and transportation costs determine basis levels in addition to financial and
physical and storage costs.
Our data uses a basis adjusted for transportation costs, called derived gateway basis, to
make transactions comparable regardless of their location. In our case, to mitigate the upward
price risk of 𝐶𝑃𝑡+1 for location j, basis contracts are used to create hedged positions that remove
all conditional price risk. When the hedged positions are established, the traders in our focus
engage in basis contracts that, in combination with the futures contracts, set a cash price. If the
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trader can secure a low basis, they are able to set a low effective hedged futures price. A more
detailed description of the basis trading background can be found in essay one.
In this study, we focus on the past performance of the traders, which can be measured by
trader margin (TM):
𝑇𝑀 = 𝐵𝑡+1 − 𝐵𝑡𝑡+1

(2)

Where TM represents the difference between the actual basis at physical delivery time t+1,
denoted as 𝐵𝑡+1 , and the basis established through a basis contract in period t, denoted as 𝐵𝑡𝑡+1.
TM provides information on how good or bad a forward trade was compared to a purchase in the
spot market at the time of delivery based on the basis of a transaction at delivery time t+1 and the
basis contract at time t. For example, a negative TM would indicate that the basis the trader
locked in in period t with a basis contract plus was higher than the basis at delivery. Like basis,
the TM is comparable by trader and for different market locations.
The grain traders that are the focus of this study are tasked with deciding when to basis
contract grain and for how much grain to use basis contracts at specific times throughout a
seven-year sample period of August 2011 to February 2018. In our study traders purchase grain
for different locations which is accounted for by analyzing each trader and location combined as
a separate cross-section.
Our study will seek to determine if decision-making under uncertainty by individual
traders employed by the firm is influenced by various heuristics drawn from behavioral
economics. Although basis contracts are designed to remove purchase price risk for a firm
buying input products like corn, the timing of when and how much to forward contract basis is a
subjective decision taken by individual traders. Furthermore, given that the level of an individual
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trader's TM is determined by this timing decision, from an individual trader's perspective, the
length and volume of grain in a forward contract is related to the trader's expected TM. In this
sense, the volume and contract length of forward contracts contain inherent risk for the trader,
and the decision of when and how much to basis contract may be influenced by behavioral biases
linked to past performance, as well as to current and future expected market conditions. If either
the size or the range of the contract increases, so does the attached risk. The forward trades'
performance is measured by the TM that is achieved after the transaction took place. Since the
contracts are for delivery in the future, prices can fluctuate until the final delivery. Thus, the
trader might purchase grains for future delivery at a higher cost than the spot market price at
delivery. If a trader paid a higher price for corn with a forward purchase than the spot market
price at delivery, the TM would be negative. Because a long-time span for a forward delivery
provides more time for the price to fluctuate, a more extended contract may be riskier. It can be
assumed that if a trader agrees on a contract for delivery in the future, the larger the volume and
the longer the contract length, the more comfortable the trader is that the contract agreement is a
good deal for them. This study will help gain new insights into grain merchandising behavior to
support government agencies and consulting companies in creating new marketing strategies and
improving existing ones.

Literature
The question arises as to how humans behave in uncertain situations. Kahneman and
Tversky's famous prospect theory (1979) offers a suitable framework to understand behavior in
risky choice situations better. Prospect theory pushed research from utility theory and wealth
status of individuals to investigating how humans feel about a change in wealth, as was
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previously suggested by Markowitz (Kahneman, 2011, page 278). Three significant discoveries
of studying the changes of wealth were made by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The first
discovery is the status quo or reference point. Humans use a reference point to frame their
situation that ultimately guides their decisions to evaluate gains and losses. Mattos & Zinn
(2016) studied reference points in agriculture, who are the first to explore reference points in
commodity marketing. They used an experimental setting to test how grain producers use
reference prices during their marketing decisions. Their findings show that current prices and
price trends influence the farmer's decision-making, and also price expectations play a role in
their decision process.
A German study about anchoring effects among farmers with experimental auctions was
carried out in 2013. It was able to find that in a series of auctions with the same group of farmers,
the previously successful bid influenced the following auction. The authors suggested that bids’
adjustment based on the previous winning bid acts as an endogenous anchoring point. In this
case, an update of the farmers’ preferences is possible, but the update would happen regarding
the previously successful bid, which would again be an anchor. Overzealous bidding was also
not found in this study, where farmers would have bet higher to win the auctions rather than
letting their group members have a chance of winning an auction (Holst, Herman, & Musshoff,
2015).
The second discovery concerns the diminishing sensitivity to a change in wealth which is
the foundation for the third discovery, loss aversion. For example, to explain the diminishing
sensitivity to a change in wealth, a gain of 100 United States Dollars (USD) feels more critical
when the wealth changes from 100 USD to 200 USD compared to a 100 USD grain from 1,000
USD to 1,100 USD. The third prospect theory discovery is understanding how gains and losses
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are perceived, leading to loss aversion. Humans perceive the pain felt from a loss worse than the
joy of an equal gain would provide. Ultimately the behavior can be observed when people
decline to bet on a coin for equal stakes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). In a fair coin gamble with
equal stakes, the possible loss makes the possible gain unattractive.
Loss aversion has further behavioral implications. In 1985, Shefrin, Hersh M. & Statman
(1985) first described the disposition effect, who found that investors tend to hold on too long to
losing positions hoping that they turn into winners based on an aversion to realizing losses. On
the other hand, investors are too quick to sell their winning positions. The disposition effect was
studied among wheat farmers by Mattos & Fryza (2014) to learn more about the marketing
performance of wheat farmers. Their study results provide evidence of the disposition effect
among wheat farmers, where farmers are more eager to sell if prices are above the reference
price.
Beyond the disposition effect, loss aversion also plays a significant role in behavior
spanning multiple periods. It has been shown that humans do not always make rational decisions,
and decision-making is getting even more complicated when more than one time period has to be
considered. Thus, the evaluation of a current situation varies and depends on the historic
experiences the trader has made. A 2005 study by Coval & Shumway found evidence of loss
aversion among Chicago Board of Trader proprietary traders. Their study was among the first
studies to test actual rather than experimental behavior.
Prior grains from risky gambles may lead to the so-called house money effect when
traders engage in more risky gambles after being initially successful. In contrast, previous losses
can lead to a snake-bite effect (Nofsinger, 2017), also known as the playing-safe effect (Suhonen
& Saastamoinen, 2017). Both effects occur when there is very little or no chance to recover
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previous losses with additional gambles. Previous losses can also lead to the trying-to-breakeven effect (Nofsinger, 2017) when the situation offers a considerable chance to make up for
prior losses. Thus, traders who have recently experienced losses try to either make up for their
losses with more risky transactions or shy away from risk based on the expected outcomes of the
consecutive offered gambles.
Consequently, the question arises of how prior losses and gains affect risk-taking
behavior. Thaler and Johnson (1990) asked this question and found that "prior gains and losses
can dramatically influence subsequent choices in systematic ways" (p. 643). The authors
conducted a study with students and tested for evidence of different mental processing strategies
called editing rules.
Framing plays a significant role in evaluating gains and losses. When presenting or
processing information, the status quo or an initial wealth level must be set to evaluate possible
outcomes. The status quo is vital to project outcomes of transactions as gains or losses
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Framing happens during the editing phase, which is an essential
component of prospect theory. In the editing phase, individuals find their reference point and
simplify and encode their chances. Prospect theory uses editing with and without memory.
Hedonic editing assumes that humans edit the presented situation to make the prospects
appear most pleasant or unpleasant. Based on a previous study of Thaler (1980), the suggested
principles of hedonic editing are 1. Segregate gains, 2. Integrate losses, 3. Segregate small gains
from more considerable losses, and 4. Integrate more minor losses with more enormous gains.
One primary observation they make is that segregation is facilitated when longer time-spaces
separate two events. The students taking the survey indicated that they would prefer to spread out
pleasant events to several days, probably to extend the pleasure that those events cause.
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Following the same thoughts, the students should have preferred to bundle losses in one day, but
they instead preferred to spread the hurtful events to separate days. Those findings indicate that
losses are not integrated on the same day and that the second loss on a single day is more painful
than isolated on a separate day. Thaler and Johnson scrutinized their results and found evidence
that suggests that their subjects use a so-called quasi-hedonic editing rule, which builds on
subsequent outcomes. Following prospect theory, for simple prospects, humans are risk-seeking
when facing losses. This experiment revealed that the integration of losses is not always
happening, especially for more complex prospects. Here, risk aversion was increased by 60% of
the students when winning the second offered gamble would not offset the initial losses. The
students shied away from the pain, and additional loss would possibly cause the shying away
from further losses known as the snake-bite effect. Contrarily, suppose the proposed gamble
offers a chance to make up for the initial losses. In that case, risk acceptance will increase if the
proposed gamble offers a chance to make up for the initial losses. The break-even effect induces
the integration of prior losses as humans mentally eliminate their losses.
Quasi-hedonic editing also shows proof for a so-called house money effect. Humans are
risk-seeking and experience suppressed loss aversion when successive losses are smaller than a
prior gain. In this case, losses are immediately integrated with the prior gain. Further, Battalio,
Kagel, and Jiranyakul (1990) suggest that the house money effect decreases if the possible
subsequent loss gets closer to the initial stake.
In a multi-period experiment with students, Ackert, Charupat, Church, and Deaves (2006)
found that wealth changes are negligible while the absolute level of wealth is the dominating
influence for bidding behavior on stocks in a subsequent period. The conclusion was drawn after
the students were endowed with money before the experiment and showed bidding behavior
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consistent with the house money theory. Still, winning students were unwilling to bid higher
prices for an asset after an increase in wealth. While observing the horse racetrack's betting
behavior, Suhonen and Saastamoinen (2017) found that the gamblers experiencing losses earlier
in the race day show reduced risk-taking behavior as the day progresses. The study also showed
decreased risk-taking when the gamblers tried to break even, which is contrary to the common
belief that gamblers take on risky bets to increase their chances of offsetting their previous
losses. (Friesen, Jeutand, & Unlu, 2021) study decision making under uncertainty among CEOs
while comparing past unsuccessful repurchasing decisions of stocks on future stock repurchasing
decisions. They found strong evidence that losses from past repurchases influence repurchasing
decisions. The snake-bite effect could explain this behavior; traders do not want to experience a
bite repeatedly. The authors provide further insight into the effects of trader experience and
compensation.
Jaba, Robu, & Balan (2017) conducted performance assessments in the financial field
using panel data analysis. While their study focused on evaluating financial companies'
performance based on the return on equity and financial leverage, their method can be used to
evaluate individuals' performance.
Concerning our dataset, we can observe trader behavior based on recent past performance
at any point in time. For example, if a trader made losses measured by his recorded TM in the
last period, does that impact their decision to forward contract in the present period? A reference
or status quo point has to be set to capture how traders evaluate their performance. For example,
in the financial literature, this is usually the asset's purchase price, also used by Odean (1998). In
this case, this measure is not applicable, which is why the margin per trader and period was
chosen as a performance measure. A similar measure was used by Friesen et al. (2021), who
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used the accumulated gains and losses of stock repurchases over different periods as reference
points for their study. Since we do not know how grain traders self-evaluate their performance,
the quarterly periods are aligned with corn's natural growth and harvest cycle. Monthly periods
are also tested to test if a shorter period is more appropriate to capture trader behavior. Some
traders would have been recent winners and some recent losers. A panel data regression was
consulted to test how past performance influences forwarding decisions regarding quantity and
length of contracts. Results can be compared across traders during the same time interval.

Data
The original dataset for this analysis consists of single purchase transactions of soybean
meal and corn of a private company producing livestock feed. Each transaction information
includes which trader set up the trade, the dates of contract set up, expected delivery dates, actual
delivery dates, margin, and many more variables that were not important for this research
project, such as transportation mode. The dataset comprises all transactions between August of
2012 to February 2018.
In the first step, all soybean transactions were dropped from the dataset because of a lack
of observations. In the second step of cleaning the data, the transactions made by an actual
farmer were excluded. The decision to eliminate farmer-initiated trades was made because
farmers determine the forward contracting decision-making (timing and volume). After
examining the data, three corn traders had to be excluded because of the low trading activity and
the trading periods not being consecutive.
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Now the reduced dataset had to be further edited for data analysis. For example, the
prices in the dataset were not all in the same unit. While prices are in USD per bushel, the
deliveries' unit is in cents per pound. For uniformity, all units were set to bushels and USD per
bushel.
Further, it is crucial to incorporate a time component into the data to measure forward
contracts. To include the time component, the number of days between the contract set up and
the delivery were calculated. After we determined the number of days between contract set up
and delivery, all trades with seven or more days between contract set-up and delivery are labeled
as forward contracts. Forward contracts are deals that have a delivery date in the future as part of
a purchase contract and are a tool often used in commodity trading to reduce risk.
Since the panel data procedure requires strict data sorting, several steps were undertaken
to fit the data further. First, additional variables were created that extracted the year and month
from the delivery date and the unloading date to help with SAS's sorting requirements. Then all
trades were grouped by the month in which deliveries took place, and in a second set, all trades
were grouped by the month that contracts were set up. These steps were necessary to calculate
past performance and current purchasing behavior. The same was done for quarterly periods. The
quarterly periods were set per the production cycle of corn. The quarters are three months
periods from 1st of September to 30th of November, 1st of December to 28th of February, 1st of
March to 31st of May, and 1st of June to 31st of August.
The final cross-sections for the panel data regression were created by grouping trades by
trader i and by designated delivery location j. 70 designated delivery locations are in the original
dataset. Our analysis does not consider location effects. For most locations, a single trader is
responsible for repeated transactions at a time.
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Next, the average derived gateway basis was calculated for all forward contracts during a
trader's purchasing month or quarter for a specific location. The derived gateway basis is the
contracted basis adjusted for freight obtained by a trader at the contract set-up date. Usually, the
basis is defined as the difference between the local spot price for a commodity and the futures
price for the same commodity (Lorton & White, 2002). The basis differs locally based on market
supply and demand situations and varies over time. For example, grain traders use the basis to
conduct business instead of the grain price, as prices themselves can be very volatile. Derived
gateway basis means the basis was adjusted for fright or backed off to a gateway and makes
basis across different mill locations comparable. For example, if the basis was -10 Dec at a
location (mill) where grain was purchased and the transportation cost was 10 cents/bu to the
nearest gateway location, the actual derived gateway basis for the mill location would be
reported as 0 Dec basis. The last calculation was the average TM a trader achieved based on all
purchases in a delivery month. Since we are interested in the trader's performance in the past, this
average TM has is lagged one time period (month or quarter), which is the average TM achieved
by a trader in the month or quarter before a respective purchase. The new lagged average TM is
called 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 or 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑀𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡−1.

Methods
A panel data analysis approach was used to explore information across traders and
locations and time. Panel data consists of two dimensions. The first being a cross-section, i, and
the second a time-series dimension, t. Typically individuals, countries, or companies for which
several time-series observations are given (Hsiao, 2007). Ajmani (2009) describes in an example
why panel data is used to analyze the performance of financial advisors in a financial planning
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company. Several variables for financial advisors may explain the variability in profits of the
financial advisors. Vivek (2009) names variables that are observed and controllable, like the
client's wealth, the age of the trader, or the geographical location. An example of an unobserved
variable would be "salesmanship ability" (P. 110). This example matches the commercial grain
traders in this research, which have similar characteristics. Still, instead of salesmanship ability,
the grain traders are expected to have excellent forecasting ability regarding the movement of
commodity basis. Another distinction between the explanatory variables can be drawn between
time-dependent and time-independent. Gender, for example, would be categorized as timeindependent, while the job experience would be time-dependent.
Complete panels have the same amount of observations for each cross-sections and timesections, meaning that each cross-section has an observation in each time-period in the dataset.
While this represents the ideal case, many panels in real-life situations have missing
observations. Panels with missing observations are called unbalanced panels. In the present case,
the panel is unbalanced. The unbalanced data is not an issue for the SAS software, which
accounts for unbalanced data for all the applied methods. (SAS Institute, 2017). The software
detects missing data for the time series identification or other variables and treats the observation
as missing for the respective cross-section. SAS will ignore observations with missing values for
the model fit.
Besides balanced and unbalanced, models can be separated into one-way or two-way
models, where one-way models depend on the cross-section or the time-section. In contrast, twoway models rely on the cross-section and the time section of the observation (SAS Institute,
2017).
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A standard panel data model for each i with unobserved effects follows equation 3
(Wooldridge, 2016):
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝐺𝑊𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡
+𝛽2 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡

(3)

where the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is either the total amount of bushel purchased with forward
contracts or the contract length with respect to trader i and location j in time period t. β0 is a
constant and β1 and β2 are the parameters to estimate, in our case, the derived gateway basis and
the lagged average margin of a trader i for a specific location j each for a specific time period t.
The unobserved effect is αijt, and the idiosyncratic, or individual, error 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 .
For a two-way model, the error component would look a little different with
consideration of unobservable time effects, as can be seen in Equation 4 (Baltagi, 2008):
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝐺𝑊𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑗𝑡

(4)

Here the error component 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 consists of 𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 , which is now the unobservable individual effect,
λijt denotes the unobserved time effect, which is individual invariant, and lastly 𝜈ijt is the
remaining stochastic disturbance term.
Panel data models can control for unobserved heterogeneity with fixed-effects models.
Fixed-effects explore the relationship between dependent and independent variables within an
individual. The fixed-effects method allows for an arbitrary correlation between unobserved
effects αi and xijt, which random effect models do not allow. The fixed-effects enable to treat
uncontrolled subject-specific effects to be treated as constants (Ajmani, 2009). While removing
the impact of the personal characteristic, fixed-effects can assess the effect of the independent
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variables. It has to be noted that fixed-effects models cannot handle time-invariant independent
variables, such as gender. Three different approaches exist for fixed-effects models estimation,
which are (1) the least squares dummy variable model (LSDV), (2) the within-group-, and (3) the
between-group effects approach.
Two tests can be conducted to determine if a fixed-effects model was suitable for the
data. First, included with the output generated by SAS for the panel data analysis is the F-test.
For panel data models, The F-test tests for the poolability across cross-sections. The null
hypothesis states that all fixed effects are jointly zero. For the F-test, the pooled model functions
as a restricted model with the restriction that fixed heterogeneity terms must be constant for all
cross-sections. Second, the F-test compares the fixed-effects estimates to pooled regression
estimates (Ajmani, 2009; Greene, 2003). The formula for a one-way F-test can be found in
equation 5:

𝐹=

(𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑟 − 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑢 )/𝑑𝑓1
~𝐹(𝑑𝑓1 , 𝑑𝑓2 )
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑢
𝑑𝑓2

(5)

SSEr is the error sum of squares from the restricted pooled estimation, and SSEu
represents the error from the unrestricted LSDV estimation. The degrees of freedom (df) in the
case of one-way fixed effects have a numerator of N-1, while the numerator for two-way fixedeffects is (N-1)+(T-1) (SAS Institute, 2017). Therefore, if the test result is lower than alpha, then
a fixed-effects model is the preferred estimation method.
Further, a Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) was invoked. This test is also
known as m-statistic. The Hausman specification test tests if idiosyncratic errors are correlated
with the independent variables. If the test result is significant, we reject the null hypothesis of no
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correlation, and fixed-effects are considered the suitable model. The Hausman specification is
calculated in Equation 6, where S2 and S1 are consistent estimates of the asymptotic covariance
matrices of β1 and β2. In this case, m is distributed χ2 with k degrees of freedom, where K is the
dimension of β1 and β2.
−1

𝑚 = (𝛽2 − 𝛽1 )′(𝑆1− 𝑆2) (𝛽2 − 𝛽1 )

(6)

Under the H0, both estimators β1 and β2 are consistent. However, under the HA, only β2 is
consistent, which leads to declining the use of random effects (SAS Institute, 2017) P.1873.
The Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test can be used to test for
cross-sectional dependence. The SAS software can easily access this test and test the null
hypothesis that the data contains zero cross-sectional error correlations. The SAS user manual
(SAS Institute, 2017) describes the test as:
𝑇

𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑗 =

𝑖𝑗
∑𝑡=𝑇
𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑒𝑗𝑡
𝑖𝑗

𝑇𝑖𝑗
√∑𝑡=𝑇
𝑒2
𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡

(7)

𝑇𝑖𝑗
√∑𝑡=𝑇
𝑒2
𝑖𝑗 𝑗𝑡

Here eit is the OLS estimate of the error term uit, and the sample counterparts are p̂ij, which allows
for pairwise cross-sectional correlation estimation. Where T̲ij is the lower bound, and T̅ij is the
upper bound, which both indicate the overlap of time periods t over the cross-sections i and j.
The number of time periods overlapping cross-sections is denoted by the test command CDTEST
also provides the modified Breusch Pagan LM test results for large N and small Tij and the
Pesaran CD test.
In addition to the Breusch Pagan LM test, the data was tested for serial correlation with
the ARIMA procedure of SAS (SAS Institute Inc., 2017). In this case, the residuals of the single
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cross-sections were tested for serial correlation. Since serial correlation could not be ruled out,
the Newey-West was used (Newey & West, 1987). The Newey-West estimator is
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) and uses the Bartlett kernel and
bandwidth determined by the equation based on the sample size and no adjustment to degrees of
freedom and no prewhitening (SAS Institute, 2017).

Results
The data analysis is split into two parts. First, the monthly data is analyzed, and the
quarterly next. Then, two models are tested for each time horizon with either the total quantity
purchased or the contract length as the dependent variable.

Monthly Data
For the monthly data set, three additional traders had to be omitted from the analysis
because of a lack of observations. As a result, the number of cross-sections, the combination of
traders and delivery locations, for the monthly data set is 142. Time-sections in the data set are
76 individual months. Since not all traders have deliveries to each location each month, the data
set is considered unbalanced. Averages for the most important variables can be found in table 1.
The average number of bushels purchased via forward contract per trader and specific location
per month is 413,735 bushels. An average contract length is 123 days from contract set-up to
delivery. On average, the derived gateway basis is 0.014 USD per bushel, while the first lag of
the average TM is about 0.1 USD per bushel.
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For the first model, the total amount of bushels purchased via a forward contract by a
trader for a specific location (TBU) serves as the dependent variable:
𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝐺𝑊𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡
+𝛽2 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 +𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡

(8)

AvgDerivedGWBasisMonth is the average derived gateway basis that a trader could obtain the
day of contract set-up, and 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 is the average TM a trader achieved for a specific
location in the month before the purchase. The unobserved effect is 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error
component.
Several steps were taken to determine the most suitable panel data analysis method.
While the Breusch Pagan LM test did not reveal any cross-sectional dependence, the ARIMA
procedure could not out rule serial correlation. Since serial correlation cannot be ruled out, the
Newey West heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation robust estimator is applied for further
calculations.
In the following step, a one-way fixed-effects analysis was conducted for fixed crosssections. The F-test showed that the cross-sections are not showing fixed heterogeneity. The pvalue of the one-way fixed-effects for fixed cross-sections is <.0001, which leads us to assume
that the fixed effects model is the better choice than a pooled model. Next, the F-test was
conducted again for the one-way fixed-effects model but this time for the time-sections. While
the test result is insignificant with a p-value of 0.1958, the data structure is still more suitable for
assuming fixed time effects. Wooldridge (2016) points out that fixed-effects can still be the
better fit, mostly when each ai can be thought of as a separate intercept, which applies in this
case (P. 445).
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To double-check if fixed effects were the right choice for the panel data, a two-way
random-effects test was conducted to obtain a Hausmann-test m-value. Simultaneously, the test
provided a p-value of 0.0110, which is larger than alpha at 0.5%, but it was decided to use a twoway fixed-effects model with the Newey-West estimator to better suit the data set.
Finally, a two-way fixed-effects model was used to test the null hypothesis of no
influence on forward purchasing behavior by the current monthly average basis or the average
TM achieved in the previous month per trader. The two-way fixed-effects model's F-test shows
that the two-way fixed-effect is appropriate for the data with a p-value of 0.001, which is lower
than alpha at 5%. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected in favor of the fixed-effects
method.
The results of the panel data analysis for the monthly data for the total bushels purchased
for a specific location are in table 2. For the monthly data, we find no evidence that the current
average derived gateway basis significantly influences the quantity of bushels purchased by a
trader on a forward contract. In addition, although of the expected sign, the average TM a trader
achieved in the prior month has no significant impact on the quantity of bushels purchased by a
trader in a basis contract. A negative coefficient, 𝛽1, for 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝐺𝑊𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡
implies a higher basis is associated with fewer bushels purchased on a forward contract. A high
basis would indicate that the cash price of a commodity is relatively high in comparison to the
respective futures price. While a high basis may be attractive to sellers it is not attractive for
purchasers to cover their demand when cash prices are relatively high. Based on the relationship
between the basis and the cash price it would not be surprising – in the absence of purchasing
pressure – that commodity purchasers hesitate to buy corn when basis and cash prices are
relatively high. Our finding that current basis does not impact forward contract size may be
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related to purchasing pressure. If the company should run low on stock and may have to
temporarily halt feed mill production, and then even at relatively high basis levels, traders may
be influenced by wanting to avoid such production halts. Since our data focuses on forward
trades, last minute forced purchases are not included in our analysis.
A second measure of how comfortable a trader feels about a trade is the forward
contract's length, meaning the sum of the days between contract set up and delivery. The model
used for the total bushels forwarded is modified to test the derived gateway basis's influence and
the previous average TM on the average contract length:
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝐺𝑊𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡
+𝛽2 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 +𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡

(9)

For this second model with contract length as the dependent variable, the same data set used for
the first model of total bushel purchased via forward contract was used again to test for
dependent variable contract length. The model with the contract length dependent variable was
chosen to be a two-way fixed-effect model with the Newey-West estimator after consulting the
diagnostic tests.
The results for the contract length change for the monthly time horizon are in table 3. As
explained previously the average derived gateway basis has a negative signal, as we would
expect due to the higher cash price purchase level associated with higher basis levels. This time
this coefficient is also significant. If the average derived gateway basis increases by one dollar
per bushel, the contract length decreases by 107 days. A higher derived gateway basis, and
higher commodity cash price levels means higher risk for the traders, leading the commercial
traders to become more risk averse. The average TM the traders achieved in the month prior to
setting up new contracts did not have a significant impact on the contract length.
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Quarterly Data
For the quarterly data, the same models as for the monthly data were tested. As the same
tests were consulted, the main variables are the same. Descriptive statistics for the contract
length, the total quantity purchased via forward contracts, the average gateway basis, and the
average TM in the quarter before a purchase can be found in table 4. The total quantity of bushels
purchased via forward contract by a trader for a location increased in the quarterly period to
1,034,385 bushels. The average contract length for newly arranged forward contracts was about
90 days. The average derived gateway basis was 0.04 USD per bushel, and the average TM of a
trader during the quarter before a purchase was 0.09 USD per bushel. Further, the quarterly data
has 126 cross-sections of traders and delivery locations and 25 time-sections or quarters. The
model for the panel data analysis for the quarterly data with the total quantity purchased via
forward contract can be written as:
𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝐺𝑊𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽2 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑀𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 +𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡

(10)

Model 10 is the same as model 8, with the only difference in the time horizon being
quarters rather than months. The results for model 10 are in table 5. Same as for the monthly
data, several tests were conducted to find the best fitting model. An F-test result of the one-way
fixed-effects model revealed a p-value of 0.0001 which leads to the decline of the assumption of
the data's poolability and that cross-section effects are present. A similar result was obtained
from the F-test of the one-way fixed time-effects model. Here a p-value of 0.0001 also indicated
the presence of time-series effects. A final test to look at the Hausman test to decide between
random- or fixed-effects indicates that random-effects would be favorable with a p-value of
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0.288 for a two-way random-effects model. The better fit for the data is the Two-way fixedeffects approach given the data structure and the one-way fixed-effects F-test results.
As for the monthly test, a Breusch Pagan LM test (Breusch & Pagan, 1980) was
consulted. The test's p-value leads to accepting the null hypothesis, assuming no proof of crosssectional dependence in the data. The two-way fixed-effects panel analysis results were checked
with the ARIMA procedure to check for autocorrelation on the time-series part of the data.
Again, the trader's residuals were extracted from a two-way fixed-effects panel analysis and
individually by trader tested with the ARIMA procedure. Since the tests did not out rule serial
correlation, the Newey West estimator (Newey & West, 1987) is applied to the quarterly data
analysis. The SAS FixTwo command is an LSDV model. The main drawback of the LSDV
model is its restrictiveness with a large number of subjects. In the present case, the number of
subjects should not cause any problems.
Like for the monthly data, neither the average derived gateway basis, nor the average TM
are significant. To also test the contract length as a risk measure for a forward contract, model 9
was adjusted to accommodate the quarterly data and can now be written as:
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑊𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽2 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑇𝑀𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 +𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡

(11)

The results for model 11 provide evidence that the current derived gateway basis
significantly impacts a forward contract's contract length and can be seen in table 6. For
example, if the derived gateway basis increases by one dollar per bushel, the contract length
declines by 98 days. This result is similar to the monthly data where the contract length was also
shortened with an increased derived gateway basis.

87

Discussion
The data analysis results indicate that past performance has little or no influence on grain
traders' decision-making process to use forward contracts to cover the demand for corn for the
feed mills they supply. The loss aversion literature of Shefrin et al. (1985), Nofsinger (2017), and
Coval & Shumway (2005) would have not expected to see an increase in bushels purchased via
forward contracts when the past performance is good, here a high TM. It would be be difficult to
attribute a possible increase in bushels purchased with forward contracts for trader with a high
TM to the house money effect based on positive past performance. Our study is not set up in
single, consecutive gambles as the horse race betting observed by (Suhonen & Saastamoinen,
2017). Their horse race experiment takes place over a short period. Neither is our study set up
like the experiments by (Ackert, Charupat, Church, & Deaves, 2006; Suhonen & Saastamoinen,
2017), who set up experiments with students. Another significant difference is that the
commercial grain dealers are not working with their private wealth.
On the other hand, the commercial grain traders may still feel optimistic about their
performance and show more confident behavior when engaging in forward contracts. Our results
are close to Friesen et al. (2021), who found that past gains from repurchase decisions had almost
no evidence to influence future repurchasing decisions. The past performance of the grain traders
did not have significant impact on the contract length of future forward purchases. We would
have expected for previously successful traders to engage shorter, less risky, forward purchases
on the short time horizon.
The derived gateway basis at the time of purchase had a negative influence on the length
of contracts. Traders would prefer a low derived gateway basis, which means that the cost of
corn at the time of purchase in the physical market would be relatively low compared to the
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futures market. If the derived gateway basis is high, traders might also cover the demand for corn
in the local spot market at the time of need rather than purchasing in advance. The derived
gateway basis has a significant influence on the contract length. If the derived gateway basis is
high, traders shy away from engaging with contracts with delivery times far out in the future.
Limiting purchases when the derived gateway basis is comparatively high gives the traders the
chance to purchase corn in the spot market or with shorter forward contracts at a time when the
derived gateway basis is lower. While not covering their demand with forward contracts, the
traders expose themselves to the risk that the derived gateway basis of the spot price when the
corn is needed may be even higher.
The risk components of forward contracts are the volume and contract length. If either
the size or the length of the contract increases, so does the attached risk. It can be assumed that if
a trader agrees on a contract for delivery in the future, the larger the volume and the longer the
contract length, the more comfortable they are that the contract agreement is a good deal for
them.

Recommendations
In our case, the commercial grain traders of this firm did not show any significant
influence in their froward trading behavior based on their past performance. We are unaware of
an internal policy of a firm-specific reward system that would reward traders for their trading
performance in terms of the margins achieved in previous periods. It appears that traders are
more influenced by the derived gateway basis and, therefore, the price level at contract set up,
which would not support a bonus system based on past performance. While the firm indeed is
interested in the profitability of its operations, there might be higher importance of the risk
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management aspect of the traders' behavior. Meeting the demand of the individual feed mills is
of utmost importance to the firm to avoid production stops due to supply chain issues based on
poor purchasing practices of input commodities. Feed optimization can increase the profitability
of meat-producing companies, which may lead to a high interest in reducing the risk in feed
production rather than achieving the highest possible profitability when purchasing inputs. A
stable meat and poultry industry are also in the interest of the American consumer. The U.S.
meat and poultry industry provided 65.2 pounds of chicken and 54.6 pounds of beef per capita in
2018 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 2018) while also employing
about 5.4 million people while the poultry industry alone provided 2.1 million jobs in 2020
(Venable, G., 2021).

The results highlight the importance of basis trading. We suggest that traders who
understand the local spot markets and their relations with futures markets use this information
heavily in their grain purchasing decision-making process. We recommend that the education of
commercial grain traders and other market participants should focus on the understanding of
basis trading and risk mitigation strategies rather than only focusing on profitability. The trader's
past performance does not heavily influence the traders from our dataset in their decision
making, showing the importance of risk management in the agricultural- and food industry
commodity procurement over only focusing on high margins. Basis trading is not only crucial for
the traders purchasing grain but also for the farmers to make better selling decisions.
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Limitations
The number of traders is somewhat limited in the data set used for this study. A larger
sample of commercial grain traders, ideally from several different companies, would be
beneficial for the analysis. Additionally, the traders in this data set are required to cover the
demand their company dictates. Any demand of input commodities not covered with forward
contract purchases forces the traders to buy in the spot market at the spot price, not interrupting
their operations' production process. Meeting the demand and considering the feed mills' storage
capacities may impact the traders' decision-making and profitability, especially when comparing
different locations. Also related to the limited number of traders are the time spans selected for
this study. It could be possible that commercial traders would be influenced by their previous
performance if the time periods were shorter, weekly or ideally even daily. Our fairly long
monthly and quarterly periods may lead to traders not remembering their past performance.
Coval & Shumway (2005) were able to observe loss aversion based on trader performance by
dividing daily performance in mornings and afternoons.
A primary distinction between the traders of our dataset and the main body of behavioral
economics financial literature is that the traders are not using their private wealth for commercial
transactions. Individuals using their personal wealth in transactions may be more sensitive to
changes in wealth than employees in a work setting.

Conclusion
Looking at two possible reference points for commercial grain traders to base their
trading decisions on, it seems that the current derived gateway basis is more important in
influencing trading decisions than the previous performance of the individual traders. But even
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the derived gateway basis only influences the risk a trader is willing to engage in in terms of the
duration of the forward contracts and does not influence the amount of bushels the traders
purchase via forward contracts. Since our dataset is limited, it would be beneficial to test our
models with more traders and possibly shorter time periods than months to see if a more recent
previous performance impacts the decision-making of commercia grain traders.
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Tables
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the main variables in the monthly dataset
Variable

N

Mean

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

TBU (Total bushel purchased)

2,298

413,735

379,070

942

3,201,306

Contract Length

2,298

123.02

95.94

7.00

608.50

Average Derived Gateway Basis

2,298

0.01

0.37

-0.87

1.60

Average Margin t-1

2,298

0.10

0.38

-5.33

10.12

Notes: The contract length is in days. Derived gateway basis means the basis (price difference
between spot and futures market) was adjusted for fright or backed off to a gateway. Average
margin lag 1 represents the average margin a trader achieved in the most recent period.

Table 2
Monthly Fix-Two panel data model for total bushels purchased per trader for a specific
location from August 2012 to February 2018
Intercept

8,802
(105,172)

Avg DerivedGWBasis Month

-32,663
(27,053)

Avg Margin Month t-1

14,577
(13,127)

R2

0.58

Num. of Cross Sections

142

Times Series Length

76

Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard Errors are in parentheses. The model was
estimated with two-way fixed-effects panel data analysis.
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Table 3
Monthly Fix-Two panel data model for contract length per trader for a specific location
from August 2012 to February 2018
Intercept

190.03***
(29.64)

Avg DerivedGWBasis Month

-106.64***
(8.75)

Avg Margin Month t-1

-1.93
(5.53)

R2

0.48

Num. of Cross Sections

142

Times Series Length

76

Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard Errors are in parentheses. The model was
estimated with two-way fixed-effects panel data analysis.

Table 4
Descriptive statistics of the main variables in the quarterly dataset
Variable

N

Mean

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

TBU (Total bushel purchased)

813

1,034,385

1,321,626

1,000

9,046,667

Contract Length

813

89.60

73.80

7.00

372.00

Average Derived Gateway Basis

813

0.04

0.36

-0.89

1.52

Average Margin t-1

813

0.09

0.22

-0.55

2.02

Notes: The contract length is in days. Derived gateway basis means the basis (price difference
between spot and futures market) was adjusted for fright or backed off to a gateway. Average
margin lag 1 represents the average margin a trader achieved in the most recent period.
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Table 5
Quarterly Fix-Two panel data model for total bushels purchased per trader for a specific
location from August 2012 to February 2018
Intercept

-400,529
(563,159)

Avg DerivedGWBasis Quarter

-200,958
(171,713)

Avg Margin Quarter t-1

46,636
(214,204)

R2

0.45

Num. of Cross Sections

126

Times Series Length

25

Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard Errors are in parentheses. The model was
estimated with two-way fixed-effects panel data analysis.

Table 6
Quarterly Fix-Two panel data model for contract length per trader for a specific location
from from August 2012 to February 2018
Intercept

4.64
(30.39)

Avg DerivedGWBasis Quarter

-98.05***
(10.17)

Avg Margin Quarter t-1

7.91
(20.65)

R2

0.49

Num. of Cross Sections

126

Times Series Length

25

Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard Errors are in parentheses. The model was
estimated with two-way fixed-effects panel data analysis.
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The Influence of the World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimate Report Estimates
on Corn Purchasing and Marketing Behavior
Abstract
The World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) published by the USDA are of
great importance for agricultural markets. Due to the great importance of information in
agricultural markets private forecasts are also available at a cost prior to the WASDE release.
This study further investigates the importance of the monthly publication for commercial corn
traders and corn producers in their purchasing and selling decisions throughout the corn
marketing year compared to the private forecasts. The data is organized in weekly periods and
grouped by seasons. First, we take a look at the importance of the difference in settle price on the
purchasing and selling decisions of corn traders. Next, the role of the marketing week is
investigated. A seven-day period prior to the WASDE release, a seven-day period starting with
the WASDE release, and a seven-day period following the WASDE release week are created to
gain insights into trading activity around the WASDE release. Finally, the changes form the
week pre WASDE release to the WASDE week are studied to lean more about the importance of
the WASDE report compared to private forecasts. Our results reveal differences in the use of
information by commercial corn traders compared to corn producers when making marketing
decisions.

Keywords: commodity markets; Dept. of Agriculture; commercial grain traders; agricultural
producers
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Introduction
Futures and spot markets for storable commodities depend heavily on current market
information for price discovery purposes. Accordingly, the United States Agriculture Department
(USDA) has been the primary agricultural markets data collector. For more than 150 years,
trusted public data and reports have been published by USDA (Isengildina-Massa, Karali, &
Irwin, 2020). Two thousand one hundred publications are currently provided by the USDA
Economics, Statistics, and Market Information System (ESMIS).
One of the most anticipated periodical reports is the World Supply and Demand
Estimates (WASDE), prepared by the World Agricultural Outlook Board (WAOB). This
monthly report provides information and forecasts for the annual production, trade, and use of
the major agricultural commodities in the U.S. and worldwide. Isengildina-Massa, Karali, &
Irwin (2013) point out the public good role of the WADSE. The report’s high quality and
“benchmark” role can be explained by the problem of private underinvestment in information
and the invested resources of the USDA (p.5086). The WASDE report is credited to “enhance
the efficiency of resource allocation in the agricultural sector (Adjemian, 2012, P. 238). The
importance of the report is highlighted by the fact that its release influences market prices. For
example, Isengildina-Massa, Irwin, Good, & Gomez (2008) found that the return variance on
report release days is 7.4 times larger for corn than on other days. Due to the importance of the
information provided, the WASDE is prepared in a secure environment, preventing information
from leaking. Therefore, on the scheduled release dates, interested parties can access the report at
the exact scheduled release date (Adjemian, 2012).
Nevertheless, the role of the WASDE has been questioned since the 1980s based on a
mixture of cuts in fiscal spending and the rise of private information sources (Just, 1983; Xie,
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Isengildina-Massa, Dwyer, & Sharp, 2016). Besides publicly-funded reports, private forecasts
are typically available to paying subscribers. The popular press is usually quick to share
information from those private forecasts with a broader audience. Forecast reports by private
companies preceed the USDA in their report publications by a couple of days, raising the
question of whether the private information is making the costly public WASDE announcements
somewhat redundant.
In 2013 the October WASDE report was missing due to a lapse in appropriations
(Adjemianet al., 2018). The importance of the report as a market signal was highlighted by
Adjemian et al. (2018), who found that in the absence of the missing WASDE report of 2013,
futures and options prices did not react in a typical manner the day the report should have been
released. In addition, Egelkraut et al. (2003) found that private forecasts did not provide superior
crop production forecasts compared to the WASDE. As such, the private forecasts do not
supplant USDA forecasts. They concluded that while the economic value of the private and
public reports appears to be similar, private reports could provide a small window of opportunity
before the public absorbs the information. Our study has the unique opportunity to study the
effect of private information and public report releases on commercial trader behavior in a
private company. The data also contains sales initiated by corn producers trading with the private
company, allowing a view on the producer’s behavior.

Literature
The robust version of the efficient market theory states that prices should reflect all
public and private current information at any time, implying that rational agents update their
price expectations immediately upon receiving any new information. Numerous studies have
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investigated commodity market responses to the different USDA reports. The USDA’s most
significant monthly report is the WASDE, which projects national and international supply and
demand factors across all agricultural markets. Besides the WASDE, the USDA issues a national
report known as the Crop Progress2 report and the Crop Production Report3. The Crop Progress
report observes crops’ development status through the growing season, and the Crop Production
report projects production and yields.
Lehecka (2014) found that the USDA Crop Progress report “provides additional and
valuable information for participants in corn and soybean markets,” despite private sector
analysis and available weather information (p.103). McKenzie (2008) summarized from previous
studies that crop reports produced by private companies “are good proxies for market
expectations” and that private reports anticipated “at least some information contained in USDA
reports” (p.352). Previous research has focused on a broad aggregate market trader/agent
behavior and has assessed futures price responses to the information contained in private and
USDA reports. The extant literature shows that futures prices respond to new or unanticipated
information contained in USDA reports. This unanticipated or surprise element of the report is
measured as the difference between official USDA numbers of grain stocks and private anlalyst
forecasts of grain stocks. When USDA grain stock figures are larger than private analyst
forecasts – indicating supply is larger than previously expected by the market – prices fall, and
vice versa. Unlike prior studies using aggregate (future market) data, our research will differ by

2 More information about the Crop Progress can be found here:
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1048
3 More information about the Crop Report can be found here:
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1046
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analyzing the impact of private forecasts and USDA reports to influence producer selling
behavior or private company purchasing behavior, unlike prior studies using aggregate (future
market) data.
Behavioral economic heuristics may play a role in marketing and purchasing of
commodities around the release of USDA reports. The foundation for extensive research in
anchoring, or the use of reference points, was laid out by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) when
they introduced the heuristic principles people use when faced with decisions that require the
assessment of probability. “When faced with uncertainty, people will grasp at straws to find a
basis for the view” (Montier, 2002, p.5). Unfortunately, the use of those heuristics tends to create
systematic errors. Anchoring is described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) as different
estimates yielded by different starting points leaning towards the initial values. Later Kahneman
describes anchor effects as: “Cases in which a stimulus or a message that is designated as
irrelevant and uninformative nevertheless increases the normality of a possible outcome”
(Kahneman, 1992, p.308). Anchors may be more or less strong depending on the functioning of
norms and an individuals’ impression of relevant values and the stimuli’ level of judgment.
Anchoring is the process of adjusting estimations away from an initial starting point, which
serves as an anchor, where adjustments are biased towards the initial starting value. Hence,
different anchors lead to different estimations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
In contrast, the reference point plays an essential role in determining the evaluation of
gains and losses, which in Bernoulli’s theory would have been the state of wealth to determine
utility. Typically reference points are used as “salient neutral points on evaluation scales” for the
judgment of abrupt changes “at which the slope of the value function shows a sharp transition”
(Kahneman, 1992, p. 310). Both reference points and anchors can be adjusted over time.
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The literature on anchoring and reference price effects in agricultural commodities
marketing decisions is somewhat limited. Mattos and Zinn conducted one of the very few studies
with farmers about the formation and adaption of reference prices in 2016 in Canada. Seventyfive farmers participated in a pen and paper experiment about marketing their grain over ten
months. The researchers found that farmers used reference prices (which they called satisfy price
to express their satisfaction when achieving this price) and regularly updated those reference
prices. Contrary to falling market prices, farmers set their reference prices above the market price
and then updated faster when the market prices rose. The reference price was also updated based
on the farmer’s future market price expectations, when price trends changed, or when the
farmer’s price expectation had changed (Mattos & Zinn, 2016). The experiment also showed that
farmers tend to sell proportionally more grain when the current market price is above their
reference price and vice versa. Problematic is the finding that farmers sold less grain when they
expected a bearish market, which might lead them to hold on to their grain for too long to
achieve a satisfying price for the grain.
Studies about anchoring or reference prices are more prevalent in other economic
research disciplines than agriculture. Several studies in the financial literature found an
inconsistency in the efficient market theory and its underlying assumptions. In their 2004 study,
the 52-Week High and Momentum Investing, George and Hwang (George & Hwang, 2004)
found that the 52-week high price stock price strongly influenced how traders react to new
information regarding the particular stock. If the price was near the 52-week high, traders
hesitated to bid on a higher price, even though good news indicated a higher value. Once the
excellent news accumulated, traders moved the price up continuously. In the opposite case, when
the price was far below the 52-week high, traders tended to hold on to the stock. They describe
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this initial hesitation to adjust to new information initially as an under-reaction and as an
anchoring bias towards the 52-week high price that the market resolves in the long run if
information prevails. The authors concluded that the 52-week high price as an anchor was a
better predictor for future returns than the historical returns would have been (George & Hwang,
2004).
The 52-week high price might as well play an essential role as an anchor for farmers.
Farmers can monitor the commodity prices in real-time online, subscribe to newsletters or
specialists, or communicate with their marketing business partners and base. Zinn and Mattos
(2016) found that the highest price to date was statistically significant in their experiment in the
creation of reference, also called satisfy prices in the experiment. Grinblatt & Keloharju (2001)
found that monthly high or monthly low stock prices influenced stocks’ buy or sell decisions. On
the contrary, Baucells, Weber, and Welfens (2011) found the influence of historical peaks only
marginal. They described reference price formation as depending on the purchase price of the
stock and the latest available price. Kahneman (1992) highlighted the importance of future
research to gain deeper insights into the formation and combination of different reference prices.
Reference points are used to compare outcomes to a reference, which can be for example
a comparison of a price to an expected price. In decision sciences, reference points are often
considered to be created in conjunction with the expectations of decision-makers. Further
reference points are often subject to change and updates when the underlying expectation is
adjusted to new information (Tonsor, 2018; Baucells et al., 2011; Wenner (2015). Anchoring
bias describes how decision-makers are influenced by salient information or first impression in
the decision maker’s environment that are used as anchors to make decisions. A typical example
here is to ask participants to make guesses after spinning a wheel that will show randomly small
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or large numbers. Participants that are shown higher numbers on the wheel tend to make higher
guesses for unrelated questions than participants being shown small numbers on the random
wheel (Epley, 2013, Anchoring, p.28). Extensive research has been done on reference points and
consumer decision-making. However, much less research has concerned reference point
decision-making in agricultural commodity markets. For example, how producers in agriculture
use reference points in decision-making under uncertainty has received little attention (Tonsor,
2018), and no known research has analyzed this issue beyond the farmgate. A study from 2016
by Bianchi, Drew, & Fan found assertive anchoring behavior when using the 52-week high
momentum strategy in commodities to learn about conservatism bias. Conservatism bias was
first described in the economic field by Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny in 1998 and is the delay in
updating beliefs and slow reaction to new evidence. Besides the strong anchoring, Bianchi et al.
(1916) confirmed conservatism bias for commodity trading. In our case, since the commodity
traders and corn producers are not traditional financial investors, we use the stock-to-use ratio
predictions of the monthly USDA WASDE report as a reference. The WASDE reports are highly
anticipated populations in the physical commodity trading world as the stocks-to-use ratio and
other estimates in the report are used to form opinions about supply and demand situations for
the traders and the producers. It is a common belief that momentum trading or price rally trading
exists when farmers react to rising commodity prices and sell greater quantities when commodity
prices rise. First, the futures prices rise, then the spot prices follow. This momentum continues
until spot prices catch up and the basis decreases. In our study, we test both the release of the
WASDE report with trading activity in the weeks during, at release, and after release and the
surprise of the stocks-to-use ratio publication of the WASDE after private forecasts as reference
points for corn producers and commercial traders.
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Data
A private grain trading company provided the data set for this study. All corn trading
transactions between July 2011 and February 2018 are recorded in the data. The data was set up
in weekly periods and divided into four seasons. In the next step, the data set was split into two
parts, one for the traders and the other for the producers, which are later analyzed separately. The
first group are the transactions entered into by commercial traders. The commercial traders
initiate their buying decision using contracts to purchase corn with grain merchandising firms.
In contrast, with regard to our second group consisting of producers, the producers
initiate the timing of the marketing/selling decisions. Therefore, the split data set will allow two
different analyses based on a sale or purchase decision-maker. This separation is important as the
decisions made by corn producers differ from the commercial grain traders, and we want to
identify the factors that impact these buying and selling decisions or behavior. Units in the
dataset are in U.S. dollars (USD) per bushel.
In addition, WASDE surprise information and nearby (contracts closest to maturity time)
corn futures settle prices were collected over the same period. The settle price refers to the last
trading day price for the nearby corn futures on the futures market exchange. The WASDE
Surprise is calculated by comparing the stocks-to-use ratio of the WASDE outlook to the stocksto-use ratio forecasted by private firms. The private forecasts were obtained from Bloomberg.
First, the beginning stock and total production need to be estimated, then the total use of corn can
be subtracted from the available corn to calculate the ending stock per year. The stocks-to-use
ratio is the percentage of corn that remains in storage as a carryover divided by the total use of
corn in the United States for a corn marketing year. The WASDE Surprise is the percentage
difference between the WASDE numbers and the private forecast numbers.
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The WASDE and private forecast estimates for stocks and use are updated monthly. The
carryover stock estimates influence the supply and demand market situation that determines the
price for commodities. The median WASDE Surprise is the natural logarithm of the WASDE
stocks-to-use ratio minus the natural logarithm of the private forecast stocks-to-use ratio.
Positive surprises reflect an unexpectedly larger supply of corn than the market anticipated and
typically result in futures price decreases. In contrast, negative surprises reflect an unanticipated
smaller supply of corn and are associated with futures price increases. The larger the surprise
(positive or negative), the greater the likelihood that there was a lot of market uncertainty as to
the true supply and demand picture prior to a release date. Hence, we use the size of surprises to
proxy market uncertainty and hypothesize that large surprises and uncertainty may negatively
impact commercial traders’ purchasing behavior and producers’ marketing behavior.
Several calculations had to be conducted to finalize the data preparation. All calculations
are across all traders and all locations, or respectively across all farmers and all locations. First,
for each weekly period, the total quantity purchased was calculated. All purchased quantities are
the quantities the purchaser and seller agreed upon when the contract was initiated. Ultimately
there is a possibility that not all the amounts contracted were delivered at contract maturity.
Since our focus is on decision-making, we are looking at the agreed-upon quantity at the time of
contract agreement. Secondly, the mean settle price of the nearby futures contract for corn per
period was calculated and added. Both the total purchased quantity for the traders and the total
sold quantity for the farmers and the mean settle price were log-transformed, and the difference
of each to the previous period was recorded. They were respectively named Diff Qty and Diff
Settle.
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Dummy variables are created to categorize the dates on which transactions took place in
weekly data. The category “WASDE” “starts with a WASDE release day and contains an
additional six days. Category “PreWASDE” “contains the seven days before a WASDE release
day, and finally, the last seven-day period “PostWASDE” “follows the WASDE release period.
For example, in January 2013, the WASDE report was released on January 11. The PreWASDE
period ranged from the 4th to the 10th, the WASDE period from the 11th to the 17th, and the
PostWASDE period from the 18th to the 25th. Additional to the dummy variables for the different
trade periods regarding the WASDE release, seasonal dummies were created. The WASDE
report was released at 8.30 am EDT before January 1, 2013, and at 12 pm EDT after January 1
(USDA, 2012). This change in release time does not affect our data. Both times are before the
futures trading for corn futures closes, and the daily settle price is registered at 1.20 pm C.T.
(CME Group).
Seasonality is important for the marketing cycle of agricultural commodities, and to
capture this impact dummy variables were created for Fall (September 1 to November 30),
Winter (December 1 to February 28), Spring (March 1 to May 31), and Summer (June 1 to
August 31). Each of the seasons includes three months per year.
In addition to the dummy variables, several interaction terms were created to capture
specific effects for the seasons and weeks. First, the difference in settle price was paired with the
seasons, (Diff Settle x winter, Diff Settle x spring, Diff Settle x Summer), and for the week types,
(Diff Settle x WASDE, Diff Settle x PostWASDE). The final interaction term was the WASDE
Surprise and the seasons (WASDE Surprise x Winter, WASDE Surprise x Spring, WASDE
Surprise x Summer).
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An interesting occurrence happened in October of 2013 when a lapse in federal funding
hindered the release of a month’s WASDE report (USDA announces cancellation and
postponement of selected reports impacted by the lapse in federal funding.). As a result, the
missing month was removed from the data.

Methods
Several separate analyses were conducted for this study. The data analysis relied on
spreadsheets constructed using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft). In addition, all statistical tests were
conducted with (SAS Institute Inc., 2019)4.
The first model analyzes the change in the quantity of corn purchased by commercial
grain traders employed by a large agribusiness firm based on the change in the average weekly
futures settle price of corn. Second, the model was used to determine if weekly futures price
changes affect the quantity of corn marketed/sold by farmers to the large agribusiness firm. A
priori, we would expect positive price changes to incentivize producers to market their corn.
Therefore, we hypothesize that weekly futures price increases will lead to increases in the
quantity of corn sold by producers. At first blush, one might expect weekly futures price
increases to negatively impact the quantity of corn purchased by commercial traders. However,
given that our commercial traders are incentivized to buy corn on basis rather than price, and in
addition that grain merchandising firms/elevators often lower their basis quotes in rising futures
markets, we hypothesize that weekly futures price increases may also lead to higher quantities of

4 The data analysis for this paper was generated using SAS software. Copyright © [2002-2012] SAS Institute Inc.
SAS and all other SAS Institute Inc. product or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of SAS
Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA.
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corn purchased by our commercial trading group. The model was applied separately to the
commercial grain trader group and the selling farmer group. Model 1 can be stated formally as:
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷2𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷2𝑡 )
𝛽4 𝐷3𝑡 + 𝛽5 (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷3𝑡 ) + 𝛽6 𝐷4𝑡 + 𝛽7 (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷4𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

1

Where i stands for either the commercial grain traders or the selling farmers, and t represents the
time period. The weekly quantity changes in corn either bought (by traders) or sold (by
producers) serves as the dependent variable. The model’s independent variables are the weekly
average difference in corn futures settle price and the seasons. The different seasons are
represented as indicator variables. The fall season serves as the base case season and is captured
in the intercept term 𝛽0. The following terms are used to represent the seasonal indicator or
dummy variables:
D2 = 1 if Winter, 0 if otherwise,
D3 = 1 if Spring, 0 if otherwise,
D4 = 1 if Summer, 0 if otherwise.
Further, we use three interaction terms to capture the potential impact of price changes during
specific seasons: (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 x 𝐷2𝑡 ), (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 x 𝐷3𝑡 ), 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 x 𝐷4𝑡 ). The error term
is 𝜀𝑖𝑡 . Descriptive statistics for model 1 are in table 1 for traders and producers.
In the next model, model 2, the different weekly time periods around the release of the
WASDE report were included to isolate the impact of the WASDE release as a factor affecting
purchasing or selling behavior. Model 2;
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 ) + 𝛽2 𝐷5𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷5𝑡 )
+𝛽4 𝐷6𝑡 + 𝛽5 (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷6𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

2

in model 2 𝐷5 𝑎𝑛𝑑 D6 represent the different weekly periods around the WASDE release dates:
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D5 = 1 if WASDE week, 0 if otherwise,
D6 = 1 if PostWASDE week, 0 if otherwise.
As in model 1, interaction terms were used (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 x 𝐷5𝑡 ), (𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 x 𝐷6𝑡 ) to capture
price impacts during specific time periods. In this case, the interaction terms capture price
impacts during the week immediately following the report release (WASDE), and price impacts
during the week occurring two weeks following the release date (PostWASDE). The PreWASDE
period serves as the base category and is captured in the intercept term 𝛽0 in equation (2),
Descriptive statistics for model 2 can be found in table 2 for the traders and table 3 for the corn
producers.
A third model was tested to see if the seasons, or the period when the report was released,
affected the results. Model 3 was tested only for a dataset containing prices and quantities of
corn purchased and sold immediately around the WASDE, starting with report release dates.
Specifically, model 3 looks at the quantity changes from the PreWASDE week to the WASDE
week. The dependent variable of model 3 measures the change in the quantity of corn sold or
purchased from the week prior to the WASDE release to the immediate week following the
WASDE release. In this sense, we isolate the specific impact of the report on trader purchasing
and producer marketing behavior. The dependent variable is named “WASDE Diff Qty.”
𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝐷2𝑡 + 𝛽4 (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷2𝑡 ) + 𝛽5 (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷2𝑡 )
+𝛽6 𝐷3𝑡 + 𝛽7 (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷3𝑡 ) + 𝛽8 (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷3𝑡 )
+𝛽9 𝐷4𝑡 + 𝛽10 (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷4𝑡 ) + 𝛽11 (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝐷4𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

3

As previously, indicator variables are used to capture seasonal effects, with the fall period
representing the base period, which is captured in the intercept term 𝛽0. In equation (3).
D2= 1 if Winter, 0 if otherwise,
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D3 = 1 if Spring, 0 if otherwise,
D4 = 1 if Summer, 0 if otherwise.
Further, we use three interaction terms of the continuous WASDE Diff Settle and each of the
seasons (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 x 𝐷2𝑡 ), (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 x 𝐷3𝑡 ), (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 x
𝐷4𝑡 ), For model 3, interaction terms were also used for the WASDE Surprise
(𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 x 𝐷2𝑡 ), (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 x 𝐷3𝑡 ), (𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐸 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 x 𝐷4𝑡 ). Table 4
represents the descriptive statistics for the commercial grain traders, and table 5 shows the
descriptive statistics for the corn producers.
The SAS AUTOREG procedure was used to estimate all three model specifications. The
AUTOREG procedure provides a battery of residual diagnostic tests to account for nonnormality and serial correlation. Residual diagnostic results are presented at the foot of each
results table and show that our model specifications do not suffer from non-normality, serial
correlation, or heteroskedasticity. Next, further residual diagnostic checks were conducted with
the SAS ARIMA procedure, primarily focusing on the autocorrelation check for white noise.
Finally, the SAS MODEL procedure was consulted to rule out heteroskedasticity with the
Breusch-Pagan test and White’s test. Based on the residual diagnostics, the most suitable model
was chosen for traders and producers and each of the three tested models. The Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression analysis requires that several assumptions are met. With the
independence of the errors being the primary assumption. Since the problem of error dependence
is not uncommon in time series analysis, the SAS AUTOREG procedure offers methods for
autoregressive error correction. When a second-order autoregressive progress is selected in SAS,
the Yule-Walker method of estimation, as described in Gallant and Goebel (1976), is applied
rather than the OLS method.
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Results
The analysis section is split into two separate parts to capture the different drivers for the
decision-making of commercial grain traders and corn producers. First, the data for the
commercial grain traders are analyzed, and the second section will investigate the farmer’s
behavior.

Commercial Grain Traders
This section evaluates the data for the commercial grain traders. The null hypothesis
states that the release of the WASDE does not affect the purchasing behavior of commercial
grain traders purchasing corn.

Model 1 commercial grain traders
First, model 1 is tested to assess if the weekly change in the average corn futures settle
price influences the quantity of corn purchased by traders across seasons. The parameter
estimates for model 1 for the commercial grain traders can be found in table 6. Model 1 for the
trader group was chosen as a second-order autoregressive model based on the residual analysis
for which the Yule-Walker estimation method was applied. Results show that weekly price
increases generally do not affect the traders’ corn purchasing behavior throughout the four
different seasons. Furthermore, even when looking in more detail at the price effects during the
different seasons, no significant influence on the commercial traders’ corn purchasing behavior
was observed during any season. This result is not unexpected as traders are responsible for
supplying the manufacturing facilities year-round to keep up production.
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Model 2 commercial grain traders
Model 2 for the traders was also tested with the second-order autoregressive Yule-Walker
estimation. Concerning model 2, estimates revealed insignificant interaction effects for futures
price changes observed for the PreWASDE, WASDE, and PostWASDE weeks. Results presented
in table 7 reflect the estimated independent or separate effects of weekly futures price changes
and WASDE and PostWASDE weeks on quantities of corn purchased by commercial traders.
Results reveal that the quantities of corn purchased by commercial traders during the week
before the WASDE release weeks were significantly positive at the 5% level, with a coefficient of
0.24 for the intercept term. This indicates that traders’ weekly corn purchases increase by 0.24%
during the PreWASDE period. Results also reveal that the corn quantities purchased by
commercial traders during the week immediately following a WASDE release date are
significantly lower compared to the PreWASDE period. During the WASDE week, commercial
traders’ change in weekly corn purchases declined by 0.41% compared to the PreWASDE weeks.
The decline during the WASDE period was also significant at the 5% level. This would be
consistent with the notion that increased volatility in futures prices and basis levels immediately
following a report release increase the risk of buying corn during these weeks. Hence, the
quantity of purchases is lower. The PostWASDE weeks showed insignificant changes in
purchased quantities of corn by commercial traders, compared to the PreWASDE period.

Model 3 commercial grain traders
The final 3rd model for the commercial traders focuses on the change from the
PreWASDE to WASDE weeks by isolating the PreWASDE weeks in the data and adding the
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Mean Surprise variable with its respective interaction terms to capture the surprise factor of the
WASDE report compared to private forecasts. In this case, a regular OLS model was used, and
the results can be found in table 8. The results show that all variables and interaction terms are
insignificant at the 5% level. At the 10% level of significance only the winter period compared to
the fall intercept showed a decline of 0,46% in the purchases of commercial grain traders.
Neither the change in settle price nor the mean surprise effect influenced the purchasing behavior
of the commercial corn traders in our sample.

Corn Producers
The second part of the results section shows the same models as for the commercial grain
traders, but this time, the models seek to reveal insights into the decision-making of the corn
producers. Again, the corn producers are the counterpart to the commercial grain traders, and the
producers make selling decisions rather than purchasing decisions.

Model 1 corn producers
Model 1 for the corn producers was tested with a second-order autoregressive YuleWalker model to test whether any seasons or changes in the weekly average settle price would
influence the selling behavior of corn producers. Table 9 displays the results of model 1 for the
corn producers, showing that the coefficients for the different seasons show no significance per
se, except summer. Sales during the summer season are slightly higher by 0.19%, significant at
the 5% level, over the fall which may be caused by producers wanting to clear out their storage
for the new coming harvest.
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The coefficient for the Diff Settle is insignificant, but during the winter season, the Diff
Settle is highly significant (the interaction term between price change and winter), at the 1%
level. An increase in Diff Settle during the winter season of 1% would cause corn producers to
increase their sales by 12.64%. Corn sales during the winter months are a popular time for
farmers to sell their physical commodities. The prices are typically higher than during the harvest
period, and the farmers can profit from storing their grain. However, storing agricultural products
carries risk, and producers need new cash to prepare for the new planting season, which means
producers don’t want to hold on to their products for too long.

Model 2 corn producers
The 2nd model for the producers focuses on the selling behavior during the different week
types, the PreWASDE, WASDE, and PostWASDE weeks. For this model, a second-order
autoregressive Yule-Walker was utilized. The results presented in Table 10 show no significant
coefficients for Diff Settle at the 5% level. However, at the 10% level of significance, the Diff
Settle during the WASDE weeks positively influences the quantities sold by corn producers. In
this case, a 1% increase in Diff Settle would cause the sales by producers during the WASDE
week to increase by 5.91%. This indicates that producers likely pay attention to WASDE reports
as they are aware that prices can move dramatically in the wake of WASDE releases. During
times when prices increase following a report producers may use this as a signal to sell their
corn. This result is consistent with the notion that producers at least in part base their
marketing/selling decisions on momentum trading or price rally trading.
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Model 3 corn producers
Lastly, model 3 for the producers was estimated using the OLS method, and the results
are displayed in table 11. Model 3 focuses on the WASDE weeks of the data set and contains the
Mean Surprise effect in addition to the Diff Settle. The coefficient for the Mean Surprise during
the spring season indicates producers significantly increase sales increase during the WASDE
weeks in the Spring season. For example, a 1% increase in the Mean Surprise would mean an
increase of 16.8% of corn sales by producers during the spring season for the weeks that start
with a WASDE release compared to the PreWASDE weeks, significant at the 1% level. This
strong reaction to the Mean Surprise confirms the finding of prior studies (e.g., McKenzie, 2008;
Lehecka, 2014) that USDA forecasts are valuable market information despite other private
reports and other available data. However, the direction of the impact is counterintuitive. Larger
surprises should be associated with larger than expected supply and lower prices. Therefore, it is
not intuitive why producers would increase sales based on such a signal? During the spring
season, the Diff Settle also shows significance at the 10% level, where a 1% increase in Diff
Settle would cause the spring sales of corn by producers during WASDE weeks to increase by
25.86%. Compared to model 1, where producers sold more corn during the winter while
disregarding the week types and the Mean Surprise, producers may be more sensitive to
economic information during the spring. Producers may have sold a rather larger share of their
production before the spring season. They may try to time the market to their best advantage
during the spring to sell their remaining stock of corn, hence the sensitivity to the WASDE report
release and the WASDE Surprise information.
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Discussion
From the results, we can see that the seasons do not majorly influence the corn
purchasing behavior of commercial grain traders. Also, WASDE reports were not of significant
importance to the corn purchasing behavior of those commercial traders. We found grain traders'
purchases were not affected by the change from the PreWASDE week to the WASDE week or by
the surprise factor of the WASDE estimates. This result is perhaps not surprising given that
purchases must be made year-round and that the traders are not pricing sensitive but instead
make their buying decisions based on the basis and the need to keep feed mills continually
stocked.
On the other hand, the producers seem to adjust their corn sales throughout the year, as
can be observed with sold quantities of corn differing for the seasons. For example, during the
winter, the Diff Settle led to a steep increase in sales by producers, but during the summer, the
price was not the driving factor for a slight increase in sales compared to the harvest period.
When looking particularly at the WASDE publication and the change from the PreWASDE to the
WASDE week, the results show that the Mean Surprise in the spring and had a considerable
influence on the producer’s sales. While we do not know to which extent the producers have
access to private corn supply and demand forecasts, the information content of the WASDE is
valuable information that the producers use to make selling decisions, at least during the spring
season. Mattos and Zinn (2016) found that grain selling producers sell more when the current
market price is above the producers’ reference price. The producers in our study then to react to
the Mean Surprise in the spring, when corn process are traditionally rising. A higher Mean
Surprise would mean a higher stocks-to-use ratio and lower prices, making this observation
unexpected. Higher sales at prices that are expected to drop is counterintuitive to the theory of
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producers using the Mean Surprise as a reference for their sales decisions. On the other hand it
could be a sign of conservatism bias (Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998) where the producers
are slow to update their beliefs to new evidence.
We also observe from the results that the commercial grain traders adjust their purchasing
behavior of corn during the different week types. Meaning the release of the WASDE report
triggers a response in the purchasing behavior of corn. Most corn is purchased in PreWASDE
week, meaning the seven-day period before the WASDE release. During the week starting with
the publication of a WASDE report by the USDA, the purchases of corn initiated by the
commercial grain traders of our sample declined significantly compared to the PreWASDE week.
Since the purchased corn quantities by traders do not significantly react to the WASDE
releases, but the traders purchase higher quantities in the PreWASDE weeks, it can be assumed
that the traders value the information provided in the private forecasts and adjust their trading.
While the role of private forecasts is somewhat controversial with the literature concerning the
validity of public spending for the WASDE report, Englkraut et al. (2003) credited the private
forecasts with providing a window of opportunity for the paying subscribers of such paid supply
and demand predictions. While the reports were not claimed to be superior in their forecasts,
they give the paying subscribers an advantage in acting on the market before the public does.
Similarly, McKenzie (2008) also credited the private forecasts with being able to provide a good
outlook on market expectations.
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Limitations
The sample of commercial corn traders and producers has a rather limited number of
observations on either side. It would be difficult to draw definitive conclusions for the whole
population from our regionally limited sample of buyers and sellers that are all associated to one
grain purchasing company. Further, the commercial grain traders in this sample are somewhat
limited in their purchasing decisions, as they have to ensure the prevention of a production stop
at the feed mills that they purchase inputs for. Ideally the tests of this study could be conducted
with a broader sample of especially commercial grain traders.

Conclusion
Our producer results confirm that WASDE reports provide useful public information that
impacts prices, beyond that contained in private reports. From a public policy standpoint
adequate funding to produce these reports is essential for the U.S. grain marketing system to
function effectively and efficiently allocate resources.
From our limited sample, it is challenging to measure the exact extent of the WASDE
report and its forecasts as a reference point for traders and producers of corn. However, there is
evidence of its importance as a public good. While only the producers react to the Mean Surprise
directly, the WADE report publication schedule is essential to traders, who may indirectly be
affected by the WASDE. In addition, the WASDE is a reference point for the publishers of
private information who are motivated by profit in providing a better and faster forecast than the
USDA.
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Tables
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for model 1
N
Traders

231

Producers

231

Variable
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)

Mean
3,670,084
4.75
423,447
4.75

Std Dev
2,580,575
1.44
395,958
1.44

Min
290,000
3.23
28,900
3.23

Max
19,613,100
8.17
2,698,860
8.17

Std Dev
2,094,804
1.46
2,608,003
1.43
2,950,157
1.45

Min
432,000
3.29
290,000
3.28
524,098
3.23

Max
9,596,450
8.17
14,920,056
7.91
19,613,100
8.08

Table 2
Descriptive statistics for model 2 for the traders
Period

N

PreWASDE

77

WASDE

77

Control

77

Variable
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)

Mean
3,342,778
4.74
3,614,691
4.74
4,052,783
4.76
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for model 2 for the producers
Period

N

PreWASDE

77

WASDE

77

Control

77

Variable
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)

Mean
403,413
4.74
440,153
4.74
426,777
4.76

Std Dev
342,706
1.46
402,230
1.43
441,064
1.45

Min
43,500
3.29
28,900
3.28
39,000
3.23

Max
1,735,000
8.17
2,626,499
7.91
2,698,860
8.08

Table 4
Descriptive statistics for model 3 for the traders
Season

N

Fall

20

Winter

20

Spring

17

Summer

19

Variable
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Mean Surprise
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Mean Surprise
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Mean Surprise
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Mean Surprise

Mean
3,802,301
4.69
0.03
3,424,596
4.67
-0.01
3,583,298
4.91
0
3,703,953
4.77
0.02

Std Dev
2,029,660
1.64
0.07
2,626,760
1.37
0.05
1,962,404
1.31
0.05
3,675,069
1.49
0.07

Min
1,057,000
3.34
-0.08
817,837
3.48
-0.13
1,260,022
3.64
-0.1
290,000
3.28
-0.12

Max
8,204,600
7.63
0.21
12,531,753
7.26
0.11
8,301,740
7.11
0.11
14,920,056
7.91
0.17
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics for model 3 for the producers
Season

N

Fall

20

Winter

20

Spring

18

Summer

19

Variable
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Mean Surprise
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Mean Surprise
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Mean Surprise
Sum QTY (Bu)
Mean Settle (USD per bu)
Mean Surprise

Mean
402,209
4.69
0.03
590,166
4.67
-0.01
360,847
4.85
0
397,316
4.77
0.02

Std Dev
338,714
1.64
0.07
612,788
1.37
0.05
267,148
1.29
0.05
251,803
1.49
0.07

Min
28,900
3.34
-0.08
46,500
3.48
-0.13
54,411
3.64
-0.1
85,999
3.28
-0.12

Max
1,363,800
7.63
0.21
2,626,499
7.26
0.11
1,252,600
7.11
0.11
1,078,400
7.91
0.17
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Table 6
Parameter estimates for model 1 for traders
Traders Model 1 second-order
autocorrelation Yule-Walker method
Parameters
Intercept

-0.01
(0.05)
Difference Settle
-1.69
(2.52)
Winter
0.03
(0.08)
Difference Settle Winter
5.72
(4.21)
Spring
-0.06
(0.08)
Difference Settle Spring
5.88
(4.06)
Summer
0.04
(0.08)
Difference Settle Summer
2.59
(2.78)
2
0.32
R
White’s Test
0.87
(0.65)
Breusch-Pagan
0.73
(0.39)
Arima
14.67
(-0.02)
Standard errors are shown in parentheses for parameters. P-values are shown in parentheses for
diagnostic test statistics.
* Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
*** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
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Table 7
Parameter estimates for model 2 for traders
Traders Model 2 second-order autocorrelation
Yule-Walker method
Parameters
Intercept
0.24 **
(0.11)
Difference Settle
1.41
(1.18)
WASDE
-0.41 **
(0.18)
Difference Settle WASDE
-1.04
(2.85)
PostWASDE
-0.30 *
(0.18)
Difference Settle PostWASDE
-1.22
(3.09)
R2
0.32
White’s Test
1.11
(0.57)
Breusch-Pagan
1.09
(0.30)
Arima
16.43
(0.01)
Standard errors are shown in parentheses for parameters. P-values are shown in parentheses for
diagnostic test statistics.
* Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
*** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
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Table 8
Parameter estimates for model 3 for traders
Traders Model 3 OLS
Parameters
Intercept

-0.05
(0.19)
Difference Settle
5.26
(7.76)
Mean Surprise
3.85
(3.13)
Winter
-0.46 *
(0.27)
Difference Settle Winter
0.02
(11.21)
Mean Surprise Winter
-8.68
(5.46)
Spring
0.02
(0.26)
Difference Settle Spring
-9.97
(12.66)
Mean Surprise Spring
-3.36
(5.57)
Summer
-0.14
(0.26)
Difference Settle Summer
-2.77
(11.16)
Mean Surprise Summer
-3.8
(4.22)
2
R
0.15
White’s Test
0.62
(0.73)
Breusch-Pagan
0.44
(0.50)
Arima
9.69
(0.14)
Standard errors are shown in parentheses for parameters. P-values are shown in parentheses for
diagnostic test statistics.
* Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
*** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
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Table 9
Parameter estimates for model 1 for producers

Producers Model 1 second-order
autocorrelation Yule-Walker method
Parameters
Intercept

-0.10
(0.06)
Difference Settle
0.31
(2.80)
Winter
0.15
(0.08)
Difference Settle Winter
12.64 ***
(4.75)
Spring
0.03
(0.08)
Difference Settle Spring
7.21
(4.56)
Summer
0.19 **
(0.09)
Difference Settle Summer
2.20
(3.10)
2
R
0.37
White’s Test
2.87
(0.24)
Breusch-Pagan
0.42
(0.52)
Arima
11.89
(0.06)
Standard errors are shown in parentheses for parameters. P-values are shown in parentheses for
diagnostic test statistics.
* Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
*** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
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Table 10
Parameter estimates for model 2 for producers
Producers Model 2 second-order
autocorrelation Yule-Walker method
Parameters
Intercept

-0.01
(0.14)
Difference Settle
1.84
(1.39)
WASDE
0.13
(0.23)
Difference Settle WASDE
5.91*
(3.36)
PostWASDE
-0.05
(0.23)
Difference Settle PostWASDE
5.06
(3.64)
R2
0.34
White’s Test
3.00
(0.22)
Breusch-Pagan
2.11
(0.15)
Arima
9.72
(0.14)
Standard errors are shown in parentheses for parameters. P-values are shown in parentheses for
diagnostic test statistics.
* Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
*** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
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Table 11
Parameter estimates for model 3 for producers
Traders Model 3 OLS
Parameters
Intercept

0.08
(0.21)
Difference Settle
4.95
(8.59)
Mean Surprise
-0.07
(3.47)
Winter
-0.02
(0.30)
Difference Settle Winter
15.39
(12.41)
Mean Surprise Winter
-2.95
(6.04)
Spring
0.46
(0.29)
Difference Settle Spring
25.89 *
(14.02)
Mean Surprise Spring
16.80 ***
(6.16)
Summer
-0.18
(0.29)
Difference Settle Summer
1.20
(12.35)
Mean Surprise Summer
-2.82
(4.67)
2
R
0.33
White’s Test
2.18
(0.34)
Breusch-Pagan
0.01
(0.92)
Arima
9.97
(0.13)
Standard errors are shown in parentheses for parameters. P-values are shown in parentheses for
diagnostic test statistics.
* Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
*** Indicates reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
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Conclusion
This research focuses on gaining new insights into the decision-making of agricultural
commodity markets to improve training for private and commercial parties and guide policy
decisions on public spending for the provision of market information. In the first article, we look
at the trading performance of a set of commercial grain traders. We are particularly interested if
individual traders possess the ability to consistently outperform the soybean or corn cash markets
by using forward contracts. The traders differ from typically investigated speculative traders in
that they use forward trades as a price risk management tool to buy input commodities for feed
mills. For this first article, the data was set up in yearly and quarterly periods. Winner and loser
rank tests and top and bottom performance tests were used to rank and evaluate trader
performance. The results of the data analysis do not show proof that individual traders are able to
persistently outperform the market. In the short run, some traders may achieve repeated top
rankings, and the winners are able to outperform the losers in terms of achieved margin in
consecutive quarterly periods. When comparing the achieved margins of the top trader to the
bottom trader in consecutive time periods, their performance differs significantly, with the
previous trader being significantly more successful in achieving a greater margin again in the
later time period than the bottom trader of the earlier period. These results cannot be confirmed
for the yearly data where trader ranking is random. The results show that some traders can profit
from superior price movement forecasts in the short run, but superior abilities are not observed in
the long run. Further, the first paper also investigates the role of gender and the experience level
of traders as a determinant of trading performance in terms of margin. Both tests for gender and
experience were conducted for a single trading year, limiting their validity. Surprisingly we
found that inexperienced traders were able to achieve better margins than experienced trades. A
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possible explanation would be increased risk-taking by more experienced traders that may have
led to the unexpected result. As for gender, the women were able to outperform their male
colleagues during the 2017 season, but we could not confirm this finding when considering all
trades over a 6-year period. Considering the results of the several different tests we can confirm
that the performance of commercial grain traders is often unexpected and difficult to explain.
Understanding decision-making and trader behavior require further research to make markets
more efficient.
The second paper applies a panel data analysis approach to understand how the previous
performance of traders influences their future trading behavior. The future trading behavior is
measured in the quantities bought with forward contracts and the length of the contracts that
traders engage in. Both the forward contracted quantities and contract length increase in risk
when quantities are larger, or contracts get longer. The panel data analysis shows no evidence of
the traders’ past performance, as measured in the average margin of the previous trading period,
on either the quantities purchased with forward contracts or the contract length. The only
impactful factor for trader performance was the average gateway basis when measuring contract
length. Traders react, as expected, negatively when the derived gateway basis is high at the point
of contract agreement and the contract length in days becomes shorter.
In conclusion, the lack of reaction of the traders to their past performance and the
importance of the derived gateway prices may point to the importance of food-producing
companies to reduce price risk rather than their traders achieving the highest margin possible in a
risky environment. Proven skill to operate in agricultural commodity markets with tight margins
is the use of basis trading. The results show that risk mitigation is of great interest and that basis
trading techniques can help make better purchasing decisions. Therefore, efforts to promote basis
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trading should not only be limited to private companies but also agricultural producers, who can
also benefit from a deeper understanding of commodity markets to improve their selling
decisions and, ultimately, their profitability.
Finally, in the third paper, the role of public information on trader and seller behavior in
agricultural commodity markets is studied. Three models were tested each for the purchasing
behavior of commercial grain traders and the selling behavior of corn producers. Regression
analysis methods suitable for time series data were employed to understand the behavior of the
two different groups of market participants. The studied public information in this paper is the
World Agricultural Supply and Demand (WASDE) released monthly by the USDA. We are
particularly interested in the stocks-to-use ratio published in the report in relation to stocks-touse ratios published by private agencies shortly before the release of the public WASDE. The
data was categorized into three weekly periods consisting of the week prior to the WASDE
release, the second week starting with the WASDE release, and the week after the WASDE was
released. Besides the categorization into weeks, the sales and purchase datasets were also
categorized by season. In the first test, the weekly differences in quantities sold and purchased
were compared by season. Both parties, the traders and the producers showed different trading
activities throughout the seasons. First, the traders are not changing the amount of bushels they
purchase throughout the seasons and neither did the difference in settle price (Diff Settle) or the
Diff Settle and season interaction terms impact the purchasing behavior of commercial corn
traders. On the other side, the corn producers significantly increased their corn sales based on the
Diff Settle during the winter period. Corn producers also sold larger quantities during the summer
season, without the Diff Settle being the driving factor during the summer season. The second
test investigated the role of the weekly periods on the selling and purchasing behavior of corn.
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The commercial grain traders purchased more grain during the 7-day period prior to the WASDE
report publication, PreWASDE. Their purchased amount of bushels purchased dropped
significantly for the 7-day period starting with the WASDE publication and also was lower
during the 7-day control period post WASDE release week. The interactions of the Diff Settle did
not seem to impact the purchased amounts of the commercial grain traders. The second test did
not yield highly significant results for the corn producers, who showed a slight increase of corn
sales during the WASDE week when the Diff Settle rose. The final third test of this paper took a
closer look at the change form the PreWASDE weeks to the WASDE weeks with consideration of
the Diff Settle and the Mean Surprise indicating the surprise information in the WASDE of
stocks-to-use forecasts after the publication of private reports also estimating the stocks-to-use
ratio. Again like for the first test that tested the seasonal changes in purchases only, the more
detailed look at the change from the PreWASDE to WASDE week did not show much
significance for the commercial corn traders. The corn producers on the other hand showed a
strong reaction to the Mean Surprise during the spring season when the producers unexpectedly
increased their sales as a reaction to an increase in the Mean Surprise, which should indicate a
higher supply and lower expected prices for corn. If the producers used the Mean Surprise as a
reference point their decisions, we would expect different behavior.
Our results show that the behavior of the different market participants in the agricultural
markets is still not fully understood and that further research would be valuable to inform policy
makers of suitable tools to support all market participants in the provision of information and
training, while allocating financial resources in the most efficient way possible.
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